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ABSTRACT
This dissertation research investigates the social implications of computing artifacts
that make use of sensor driven self-quantification to implicitly or explicitly direct user
behaviors. These technologies are referred to here as self-sensoring prescriptive
applications (SSPA’s). This genre of technological application has a strong presence in
healthcare as a means to monitor health, modify behavior, improve health outcomes, and
reduce medical costs. However, the commercial sector is quickly adopting SSPA’s as a
means to monitor and/or modify consumer behaviors as well (Swan, 2013). These wearable
devices typically monitor factors such as movement, heartrate, and respiration; ostensibly
to guide the users to better or more informed choices about their physical fitness (Lee &
Drake, 2013; Swan, 2012b). However, applications that claim to use biosensor data to assist
in mood maintenance and control are entering the market (Bolluyt, 2015), and applications
to aid in decision making about consumer products are on the horizon as well (Swan,
2012b). Interestingly, there is little existing research that investigates the direct impact
biosensor data have on decision making, nor on the risks, benefits, or regulation of such
technologies. The research presented here is inspired by a number of separate but related
gaps in existing literature about the social implications of SSPA’s. First, how SSPA’s
impact individual and group decision making and attitude formation within non-medicalcare domains (e.g. will a message about what product to buy be more persuasive if it claims
to have based the recommendation on your biometric information?). Second, how the
design and designers of SSPA’s shape social behaviors and third, how these factors are or
are not being considered in future design and public policy decisions.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Self-quantification, or recording information about one’s daily inputs, states, and
activities, is used in the healthcare industry to encourage patients to take greater control of
managing their health symptoms (Barnett, et al., 2008; Collinge, Yarnold, & Soltysik,
2013), to promote patient self-efficacy (Gleeson-Kreig, 2006; Ngamvitroj & Kang, 2007),
to improve diagnostics, and to cut healthcare costs (Marzegalli, et al, 2008; Leong, Sirio,
& Rotundi, 2005). In the past, self-quantification was conducted by the patient manually
monitoring and recording his or her own physiological signals or behavioral activities (e.g.
recording heart rate, testing blood glucose levels at regular intervals, assessing subjective
energy level, pain level, affect, etc.) and then transferring these data to the medical provider
through note taking, data entry into a computer systems, phoning into an answering service,
or reporting to an intermediary care taker (McAdams, et al. (from Bonfiglio and Rossi),
2011 pp180-185). Compared to regular doctor’s office visits and/or waiting until symptoms
become bothersome, this method of quantification has shown some evidence that it is
indeed useful in early diagnosis, improving health outcomes, and reducing costs (Clarke &
Foster, 2012; Korotitsch & Nelson-Gray, 1999). Many recent methods of selfquantification have incorporated sensor technology (ambient and wearable) to
automatically monitor patient behaviors and biological factors in a way that data is captured
in real time with little to no action by the patient (McAdams, et al., 2011; Nangalia,
Prytherch, & Smith, 2010; Pantelopoulos & Bourbakis, 2010; Patel, Park, Bonato, Chan &
Rodgers, 2012; Song, Wang, Yang, & Li, 2014). Within the healthcare industry, the input
of self-sensor data is viewed as a critical component of diagnosis and treatment, especially
in situations where some symptoms require frequent and accurate measurement (such as
1

blood glucose levels) to properly manage (Clark & Foster, 2012). These data are generally
being used in two separate but related aspects of health care; diagnostics and prescriptives.
In diagnostic applications, medical personnel may use sensor data to identify risk factors
or changes in typical behaviors. For example, the ZIO patch heart monitor records the
wearer’s electrocardiograph information and can detect irregular heart rhythms which can
aid in early diagnosis of heart disease and aid in stroke prevention (Barrett, et al., 2014).
In prescriptive applications, medical personnel may use sensor data to generate
directives for a patient to follow, such as to change/take medications, change body position,
increase the intensity of a work out, stop a particular behavior, etc. These applications are
intended to better manage and/or prevent the onset of symptoms. For example, Bachlin, et
al. (2014) designed a wearable device for persons with Parkinson’s disease who experience
freezing of gait (FOG). FOG is a sudden, but momentary “inability” to move and can often
lead to a fall. While pharmacological treatments for FOG symptoms have shown limited
promise, behavioral treatments using external cues (such as walking to an audible beat)
have seen more success. However, behavioral treatments require conscious vigilance,
which may be difficult for older patients in the later stages of Parkinson’s disease. The
wearable designed by Bachlin, et al. detects precursors of FOG symptoms and provides the
wearer with an audible sound before the FOG occurs, alerting the wearer that he or she
should act to avoid FOG.
Prescriptive application with tangibly positive outcomes, like preventing falls, may
seem manifestly unobjectionable, however, the ubiquity and robustness anticipated for the
future of wearable devices that use SSD means developers will be able to link biological
data to behavior in ways where the prescriptives are far less objectively positive. While the
2

medical industry’s use of self-sensor data and application development and the goals they
work toward are arguably guided by government regulations and established codes of
conduct (Riddick, 2003), the ethical and regulatory standards guiding the use of self-sensor
data in consumer applications are considerably less coherent or transparent. A report from
Gartner (2016) projects revenue for SSD devices will reach 28.7 billion in 2016 with the
majority of this revenue stemming from consumer wearables for health and fitness, whihch
are projected to sell nearly 200 million units worldwide in 2016 (Woods, & Van der
Meulen, 2016). The design and deployment of these consumer products pose unique
ethical and regulatory challenges that are not well addressed in literature, especially when
contextualized as part of a broader sociotechnical system in which scientific knowledge
about the body and understandings of normality are not causal, but co-constructed (Pinch
& Bijker, 1984; Foucault, 1977; Illich, 1976; Rosenberg, 2002).
Project Summary
This dissertation research investigates the social implications of computing artifacts
that make use of sensor driven self-quantification to implicitly or explicitly direct user
behaviors. These technologies are referred to here as self-sensoring prescriptive
applications (SSPA’s). This genre of technological application has a strong presence in
healthcare as a means to monitor health, modify behavior, improve health outcomes, and
reduce medical costs (Boulos, Brewer, Karimkhani, Buller, & Dellavalle, 2014; Lewis,
Eysenbach, Jimison , Kukafka, & Stavri, 2005; Swan, 2012a). However, the commercial
sector is quickly adopting SSPA’s as a means to monitor and/or modify consumer
behaviors as well (Swan, 2013). This growing industry consists of primarily wearable
sensors that monitor characteristics such as movement, heartrate, and respiration;
3

ostensibly to guide the users to better or more informed choices about their physical fitness
(Lee & Drake, 2013; Swan, 2012b). However, applications that claim to use biosensor data
to assist in mood maintenance and control are entering the market (Bolluyt, 2015), and
applications to aid in decision making about consumer products are on the horizon as well
(Swan, 2012b). Interestingly, there is little existing research that investigates the direct
impact biosensor data have on decision making, nor on the risks, benefits, or regulation of
such technologies. The research presented here is inspired by a number of separate but
related gaps in existing literature about the social implications of SSPA’s. First, how
SSPA’s impact individual and group decision making and attitude formation within nonmedical-care domains (e.g. will a message about what product to buy be more persuasive
if it claims to have based the recommendation on your biometric information?). Second,
how the design and designers of SSPA’s shape social behaviors and third, how these factors
are or are not being considered in future design and public policy decisions.
Primary Objectives
Using an interdisciplinary approach, this research seeks to achieve three primary
objectives drawn from the existing body of knowledge on the use of SSPA’s in the
healthcare industry and their adaptation and adoption by the commercial sector.

Objective 1 (Science, Technology, and Society):
To investigate the social implications of the commercial use of self-sensor
prescriptive application technologies (SSPA’s) from a Science, Technology, and
Society perspective.

4

Objective 2 (Experimental Psychology):
To conduct an experiment using human subjects that measures perceptions and
impacts on persuasion of SSPA use in a non-healthcare scenario.
Broader Purpose
The broader purpose of this dissertation is threefold: to expand and refine
basic and applied research in the field of psychology, to contribute to future policy related
to governance of emerging technology, and, most broadly, to conduct an interdisciplinary
research project that engages different epistemological approaches to knowledge creation
and that impacts multiple knowledge domains. The three stated objectives above will
facilitate this broader purpose by identifying the risks and benefits as they pertain to the
current sociotechnological system in which the technology is embedded, using an
experimental approach to investigate persuasive impact of the technology, and developing
a value-oriented approach to future regulations related to minimizing risks while
maximizing benefits. In a strictly disciplinary approach these questions would more likely
be asked and investigated individually by scholars from different domains; however,
because each objective relies heavily on the research outcomes of the others, I believe an
interdisciplinary approach can more adequately speak to the broad question of how this
emerging technology may impact society. Given the recent drive to develop technologies
to change health behaviors (Boulos, et al., 2014; Lewis, Eysenbach, Jimison , Kukafka, &
Stavri, 2005) and the implications this type of social control might have in political and
commercial applications, understanding the impact of emerging SSPA’s is both timely and
critical.

5

PART 1 - INTRODUCTION
Competition to be the most influential forces in the lives of individuals for voting,
consumer choice, group and personal interactions, etc. is omnipresent. The future Internet
of Things (IoT), and all the Big Data it subsumes, is lauded as the ultimate tool for
consumer analytics, predictives, and influence (Swan, 2012b). The data provided by
wearable biosensors, and the algorithms that drive them, is considered a critical component
in designing this truly personalized IoT environment, but an in-depth analysis of how this
category of technology could impact society has not been conducted. Attempts to use
social, political, and economic persuasion tactics to steer publics to certain courses of
action is arguably common place, however, the emerging IoT, and the massive amount of
data it will provide access to, creates an unprecedented technosphere of influence that is
not yet fully understood. Nonetheless, IoT architects are in a full-throttle race to design
new ways to monitor, collect, and share user data through different sensor technologies
(Peterson, 2015; Wasick, 2013; Worthman, 2014) and the increasing popularity of selfquantification technologies (such as wearable activity trackers) suggests consumers are
willing to provide the data (Lupton, 2014; Lee, Egelman, Lee, & Wagner, 2015). While
those interested in the mediators of consumer choice transactions may have previously
been restricted to IoT data about geolocation, banking, and other visible demographics,
now biological, real-time information tracking about the internal behaviors of the
consumer, such as heart rate, metabolic information, genetic markers, and neurological
feedback, are also being developed as a means to understand and influence consumer
behaviors (Swan, 2012b; Swan, 2013). However, while commercial self-sensoring
technologies and applications are predicted to be a cornerstone of IoT development and
6

success (Swan, 2012a), the ethical standards, goals, and behavioral impacts effecting this
consumer industry are much less transparent. The following section attempts to examine
the implications of this lack of transparency and highlight potential social impacts of the
commercial use of self-sensors to create prescriptive applications for non-medical
consumers. These factors are explored by first defining the domain of SSPA and current
directions in research and development. Next I examine regulatory and ethical standards
for SSPA development and deployment. I then highlight deficiencies in these standards by
discussing research in the field of psychology, philosophy, and sociology that suggests a
number of, as yet, undiscussed risk potentials of SSPA’s.
Self-Sensor Prescriptive Applications (SSPA’s)
Self-sensor data (SSD) can be used as a means or as an ends in a technological
system. Table 1 lists major types of sensors that are currently used in self-sensoring devices
and the type of information that these sensors can collect. In some wearables, such as
prosthetic limbs, cochlear implants, and speech to text devices, SSD is used as a means of
communication between the body and the devices in order to control the action of the
device. In this category of wearable, the meaning of a particular quantitative measure of
SSD is defined by the design engineer(s) by programming the device to behave in some
predictable way when these quantities are present, but these quantities may not necessarily
be biologically meaningful or relevant to the user. So, for example, a myoelectrically
controlled prosthetic arm is controlled by SSD collected from electrical activity in the
residual muscle of the amputated limb. The person wearing the prosthetic limb controls
these SSD through intentional engagement of the residual muscle. However, the person
need not be explicitly aware of specific quantified measurements of the SSD for the
7

Table 1
Sensor types used in wearable self-sensor devices.
Sensor Type
Mode
Description
Accelerometer electrorate of change of the velocity of an
a
mechanical
object

Applications
orientation,
vibrations,
location, motion,
displacement

Acousticb

electromechanical

compression and expansion of solids,
liquids, or gases

sound, substrate
density,
composition

Chemicalc

voltammetric

composition,
movement, speed
of processes,
flow, force,
interaction,
temperature,
detection

electrical

energy change as result of interaction
between analyte and receptor
change in electrical potential
change in absorbance, refractive,
reflection, luminescence, temperature,
frequency change of quartz oscillator
plate
change of paramagnetic properties of a
gas
change of electrical properties

thermometric

heat change

movement of
liquid

potentiometric

change in electrical potential

electromechanical

change in electrical resistance of
chemical polymer upon application of
force
frequency change of quartz oscillator
plate
changes in shape of elastic material

force, torque,
strain, shock,
pressure

changes in
electrical capacitance or resistance
change in resistance of electrical
current
mass of an air sample compared to an
equal volume of dry air

moisture, leaks,
humidity

voltage of current between dissimilar
metals that changes with temp.
change in resistance of electrical
current

temperature

potentiometric
optical
piezoelectric
magnetic

Flowd

Forced

piezoelectric
physical
Humiditye

psychometrics
thermometric
gravimetric

Temperaturef

electromechanical
thermometric
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Sources: aSparkfun, 2016; bMediaLab Robotics, 2008; cHulanicki, Glab, & Ingman, 1991;
d
Makkonen, & Laakso, 2005; eUpp & LaNasa, 2014; fAgarwal, 2016.

prosthetic arm to have value. On the other hand, for some wearables, the quantified
measurements of SSD are the ends themselves and value is derived from the user’s desire
to know what these measurements are. This desire is driven by beliefs about the body and
these beliefs are shaped primarily by social, psychological, and political factors. For
example, if a wearable is designed to monitor myoelectric activity of a body part so that
the wearer can use the data to identify strengths and weakness of the muscle tissue, the
value of this device is driven by what the user believes these data do or do not tell him
about his body and how important it is to know this information.
The two uses of SSD are not mutually exclusive; a device can use SSD as both a
means and an ends whether by intentional design or by the design’s affordances (e.g. a
person could access the SSD data of a myoelectrically controlled prosthetic to diagnose
problems with the residual muscle tissue even if the device was not meant to be used in
this way). However, the primary focus of this research concerns devices in which SSD is
marketed to consumers as an ends unto itself because of the unique and challenging ethical
questions the design and distribution these devices raise have not been well addressed in
literature. This is not to suggest that devices that use SSD as a means do not pose equally
challenging questions related to moral and regulatory concerns, but a much larger body of
research in this field already exists. These are primarily contextualized within the field of
disability rights and assistive technologies in relation to issues of fairness, equality, and
constructions of normality (Baker, 2014; Allhoff, Lin, & Steinberg, 2011; Erkulwater,
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2006; Kass, 2003; Vaughn Switzer, 2003; Conrad, 1992) but a critical analysis of social
impacts of devices using SSD as an ends has not been done.

When a device markets SSD as an ends the success rests in the ability to convince
the user that these ends have inherent value – in other words there must be some reason the
user would want to know what these values are. The underlying theme in all such attempts
to construct a value for these devices (whether accurate or not) is that SSD inform the user
to act or not act. So a device that monitors heart rate will have little value to a runner unless
the runner has a desire to understand the meaning of the heart rate; and to understand the
meaning of the heart rate means comparing it to some baseline for normality. The runner
can interpret the heart rate as being within a normal range in which case no action is needed,
or outside a normal range, in which case action may be needed. Value for this device rests
on how important this understanding is to the runner and, through this understanding, an
action is always implied (i.e. do something different or keep doing what you are doing). In
this dissertation, this is referred to as the “prescriptive” quality of the device. This
prescriptive quality may be expressed explicitly through a user interface that provides
quantified SSD feedback and informs the user what specific actions they should take to
change or maintain these measurements or it may be more implicit by only indicating
where SSD feedback is situated to some relative measurement (e.g. higher than your peers,
lower than your personal norm, etc.). The user interface that conveys the SSD to the users
employing explicit or implicit prescription is called the “application.” Taken together,
devices that use SSD as ends are referred to here as self-sensoring prescriptive applications
(SSPA’s).

10

Consumer SSPA’s (and medical SSPA’s) figure prominently in the ongoing
expansion of the IoT. The perceived intelligence and value of IoT systems will be judged
by how data is aggregated to create (a) “cyberinferences,” in which completely new
information about an individual (or object, group, etc.) is created, and (b)
“cyberprescriptives,” in which instructions and/or actions are generated for the users or
other IoT objects. Cyberinferences and cyberprescriptives will be key in creating intuitive,
adaptive systems, and will undoubtedly impact how individuals perceive themselves, make
decisions, and interact with their world. The addition of SSD to certain IoT systems will
be crucial in generating highly accurate and intimate profiles of individual users and in
generating cyberprescriptives that are highly relevant to the user and the context at hand.
Producing such an IoT system that could reliably guide user behavior and attitudes through
cyberprescriptives (such as purchasing choices, health behaviors, social interactions,
movements, etc.) is arguably the Holy Grail for social, political, and economic stakeholders
competing for control of user behavior. It is therefore not surprising that the development
of SSPA technologies has been met with little opposition. Currently, the healthcare
industry is at the forefront in researching and developing this type of behavioral co-piloting
technology and research and development (R&D) has so far been relatively transparent in
terms of ethical standards, outcome goals, and behavioral impacts (Lewis, Eysenbach,
Jimison , Kukafka, & Stavri, 2005). In contrast, R&D policies and regulations for consumer
SSPA’s are nebulous and far less transparent.
Ethics, Regulation, and Policy. Getting a grasp on regulatory and ethical standards
concerning SSPA design is challenging, not only because it is an emerging field, but
because it is an interdisciplinary one as well. There are many actors and stakeholders
11

involved in the design cycle of SSPA’s and many points in this cycle at which ethical
standards are either unclear, unarticulated, or conflicting. Figure 1 illustrates key aspects
of the SSPA design cycle and key factors that require designers to make value-based
judgments. Here, “value-based” refers to judgements that can be influenced by personal
beliefs and goals. For example, the decision to use a pressure sensor that operates by
measuring changes in the volume of a gas substrate rather than one that uses a liquid
substrate is based on the designer’s beliefs about efficiency, costs, availability of materials
etc. in combination with their goals for the “user” which may be the manufacturer, some
regulatory body, peers, or an end-user.
Though it is difficult to definitively delineate where one field ends and another
begins, the sensor mechanics and infrastructure are primarily the domain of engineering
(e.g. mechanical, electrical, chemical, etc.). In contrast, the algorithms (from which
cyberinferences and cyberprescriptives are forged) that make SSPA’s “meaningful” are
shaped by several domains. The algorithm (or set of algorithms) essentially performs as a
decision engine from which prescriptives are derived. The task of coding a set of
commands based on input from the sensor data (e.g. when heart rate reaches >90 bpm a
message should appear on the screen) into syntactic and semantic symbols that can be
understood by both the technology and the user is a computer engineering task (e.g.
software engineers). But before that can happen, biological interpretation of the sensory
data input must be derived from a body of knowledge primarily under the domain of natural
sciences. These interpretations are rarely definitive and decisions must be made about
which to use. These decisions may be made, for example, by an engineer, a scientist, or an
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entrepreneur with access to the internet. Decisions associated with algorithm design of
SSPA is at the heart of identifying and understanding the social implications of SSPA and
are discussed further in Algorithmic responsibility, p 32.
The user interface for SSPA’s is another design aspect that falls under multiple
domains. The codification of the interface software behavior is primarily within the domain
of software engineering, but the aesthetic, messaging, and instrumental goals actualized
through the work of the engineer are based on the social, cultural, and economic needs of
the actors responsible for producing and ultimately marketing the SSPA. Finally, user

13
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Figure 1. Key SSPA design factors and the drivers, actors and processes that shape them.

behaviors themselves must also be considered as a key aspect of the SSPA design cycle;
this factor also falls under multiple domains of ethical and regulatory design
considerations. Designers within the engineering domain play a critical role in determining
the degree to which users can modify or interfere with the user interface. In order to do
this, designers must imagine the various ways in which a user could use a technology in a
different manner from which the designer intended and must then decide whether to allow
this alternate use or to prevent it by altering the design. (Whether this practice ought to be
a required responsibility of the design engineer and the extent to which this type of analysis
should be pursued is part of ongoing debate about computer engineering ethics and ethics
in technology more broadly (see Herkert, 2001; and van de Poel, 2001)). Users themselves
make choices about how and when the interface is used, but whether these choices fully
informed or not depends on how transparent the technology’s purpose, operating
instructions, and risks are. In other words, just as a pharmacy may control user behavior by
supplying childproof caps on certain prescription bottles, the patient for whom a
prescription is issued is expected to adhere to instructions on how to take the medication,
but only when these instructions are clear and meaningful. In its most basic form,
engineering related standards apply to the mechanics of SSPA’s, science and healthcare
related standards apply to the construction of a knowledgebase from which rules about
sensor data can be interpreted, private industry standards are used to pick and choose which
rules to use, and users decide how the rules will apply to them.
Just as the various components and processes involved in SSPA design fall under
multiple domains of informal ethical principles (e.g codes of ethics, industry standards,
etc), government oversight does as well. There are several government agencies that
15

regulate individual aspects of these technologies. For example, if a wearable device makes
use of radio wave frequencies, the design would need to adhere to relevant standards set
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for that specific factor. Similarly, if
the device makes use of chemical reagents, the design would need to adhere to relevant
standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for that specific factor.
However, many aspects of consumer SSPA design are unregulated; most critically,
algorithm design (and the cyberinferences and directives they afford) is not specifically
subject to any regulatory oversight so long as the product is not classified as a medium to
high risk “medical device” by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA; US Food and
Drug Administration, 2015).

This particular issue of algorithm design practices is

discussed further in Algorithmic responsibility, p 32.
Numerous industry leaders on the medical care side of SSPA development are
calling for clarification and oversight from the (FDA) to ensure that applications designed
to shape medical related behaviors adhere to some set of quality standards (Strickland,
2012; Boulos et al., 2014). However, the FDA has been slow to respond and has so far only
provided narrow guidelines related to specific apps that impact the performance of medical
devices that are already regulated (i.e. an app that “transforms” a smartphone into an
ultrasound device would need FDA approval before coming to market; US Food and Drug
Administration, 2011). Even if the FDA was to take greater control of these types of
SSPA’s, it appears that commercial SSPA’s using the same sensor technologies can simply
follow a different set rules if marketed as “wellness” or entertainment application.
The FDA released an unofficial, nonbinding set of guidelines for “low-risk general
wellness” (LR-GW) products. The very brief document, released for public comment in
16

January, 2016 was aimed at providing “clarity to industry and FDA staff on the Center for
Devices and Radiological Health’s (CDRH’s) compliance policy for low risk products that
promote a healthy lifestyle (general wellness products)” (Food and Drug Administration,
2015). The document presents guidelines for defining LR-GW products and clarifies that
such products will not be subject to FDA compliance and regulatory requirements.
The characterization of “low risk” is primarily focused on how the physical
components of the device interact with the human body. Most of the best-selling wearable
devices available today, such as the Fitbit and Apple watch, would be considered “lowrisk” under the guidelines so long as they are non-invasive (do not breach skin or mucous
membrane of the body), are not known to cause harm if the controls malfunction (eg. laser
and radiation damage), and do not damage the skin through biocompatibility issues.
Classifying a device as a “general wellness” product is much more subjective and is
primarily linked to what the manufacturer claims the device can do rather than what it
actually does. The guidelines describe “general wellness” products as those with intended
use claims solely related to:
1. sustaining or offering general improvement to conditions and functions
associated with a general state of health that do not make any reference to
diseases or conditions, OR
2. promoting, tracking, and/or encouraging choice(s), which, as part of a
healthy lifestyle, may help to reduce the risk of certain chronic diseases or
conditions; and may help living well with certain chronic diseases or
conditions. (Food and Drug Administration, 2016)
The guidelines do not address the affordances of the product, only the “intended
use” claims. This could be problematic for a number of reasons. First, while a device might
17

be marketed as a “general wellness” product according to the guidelines above (and
therefore not subject to FDA evaluation), the capabilities of the device may still afford a
user access to in-depth symptomatic information unrelated to the intended use claims, and
which would normally be used by a physician to diagnose disease or chronic illness. For
example, wearable device manufacturer Empatica produces two products that collect
similar information but are marketed differently (Empatica, 2016). The E4 Wristband is
marketed as a consumer product to provide the wearer with continuous real-time
monitoring of blood volume pulse (BVP), electrodermal activity, skin temperature, and
motion based activity. It is offered as a data collection device and the manufacturer makes
no claims related to diseases or medical conditions. This would (unofficially) be considered
a LRGW product. At the same time, the company also offers the Embrace Watch which
collects identical information, but is being marketed as an epilepsy monitor and is currently
undergoing clinical trials as a tool to prevent Sudden Unexpected Death in Epilepsy
(SUDEP). Marketed in this manner, the Embrace Watch would not be considered a
“general wellness” product because the intended use claims are directly related to diagnosis
of a medical condition. The affordances of the two devices provide the user with the same
information from which they can make decisions about their health behaviors, but the
manufacturer’s claims about the intended use for the data currently dictate whether the
device will need to go through any sort of rigorous testing about the accuracy of the data
collection or the impact the information has on the user’s actual behaviors and health.
Another potential shortcoming of the FDA’s unofficial guideline is related to a
psychological phenomenon referred to as the gatekeeper effect. This phenomenon occurs
when an authority (the gatekeeper) exercises some form of implicit or explicit information
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filtering before releasing information to a group. Research suggests that information that
is not excluded by the authority may be perceived as more persuasive even though it is not
specifically endorsed (Schweitzer & Saks, 2009). In a legal setting, Schweitzer & Saks
found that study participants were less critical of and more persuaded by scientific evidence
when it was presented within a trial setting (whether explicitly or implicitly included by
the trial judge), compared with the same evidence presented outside of a courtroom context
or explicitly excluded by the trial judge. These findings suggest that the judge, or the
judicial process more broadly, imbue the scientific evidence with a higher degree of
credibility merely by allowing (or not disallowing) access to the information – regardless
of the intellectual merit of the information itself. Thinking of the FDA as the gatekeeper,
by publishing guidelines through which a manufacturer can avoid review of their product
by making only certain kinds of claims about intended use, products that monitor health
related information are is some sense “approved” by a process of omission. When thinking
about determinations of product safety, not having FDA approval is quite different than
not needing FDA approval. The former is more ambiguous and could imply either a product
has yet to seek approval or has been rejected, however the latter implies a degree of risk so
low that it could be misinterpreted by laypersons as essentially having FDA approval
insofar as the perceiver believes the product is within the purview of the FDA. The draft
guidelines associate the FDA with product safety for these LR-GW products in a way that
didn’t previously exist. Because the affordances of the SSPA are not considered in the draft
guidelines, through careful wording of intended use claims, a manufacturer could claim a
product, which might otherwise be required to endure clinical testing, is “so safe it doesn’t
even require FDA approval.”
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The FDA’s suggested guidelines for LR-GW wearables also do not address the
issue of compatibility and data sharing with other FDA approved self-sensor technologies.
The “low-risk” requirement, on the surface, seems to limit a SSPA to a physical design that
does not breach the skin and will always be limited to a limited set of sensor types.
However, it does not make reference to LR-GW devices that can collect data from other
independent FDA approved devices that can transmit data from within the body. This could
vastly expand the scope of real-time data available to wearable devices. For example,
several ingestible devices that can monitor and transmit physiological, biochemical, and
genetic data already have FDA approval (Tolentino, 2013). As it stands now, so long as a
SSPA only makes intended use claims related to “general wellness” it could access and
provide these types of data to the user and remain outside the FDA’s purview. This could
expand the scope of data available for “general wellness” assessment to the entire
physiological make-up of the human body.
Finally, the draft guidelines also specify that “disease-related general wellness
claims should only contain references where it is well understood [emphasis added] that
healthy lifestyle choices may reduce risk or impact of chronic disease or medical
condition,” but leaves unsaid from whom this type of consensus must come from and what
standards establish it. When it comes to disease-related risk and treatment, the notion that
things are ever “well understood,” seems overly idealistic and, at the very least, temporary.
Users immersed in SSPA’s, Big Data, and the IoT will no doubt find it easier to quantify
and categorize themselves according to norms and to seek “treatments” to reach those
norms when they fall short. But it is critical to recognize that perceptions of what is and
what is not normal continually changed over time and things we consider “well
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understood” as contributing to a healthy lifestyle (and what we consider to be a “healthy
lifestyle”) are intimately tied to culture and power rather than objective interpretation of
raw data. Individuals and organizations that control medical knowledge are able to shape
these perceptions; however, some of those considered to be “part of” the medical
community, such as the pharmaceutical industry, are motivated to create or selectively
make available knowledge that most benefits their economic interests, rather than the best
interests of the patient (Poitras & Meredith, 2008; Moynihan & Henry, 2006; Goldacre,
2013). Indeed, if we consider the pharmaceutical industry as an example of a private
industry borrowing credibility from medical science to sell consumer goods, it stands as an
example of how SSPA’s may also gain influence over consumers. No doubt
pharmaceuticals are used for decidedly “medical” purpose, but how these purposes come
to be considered “medical” is sometimes a chicken-or-egg question (Goldacre, 2013). This
issue is discussed further in the context of medicalization and control in Social control, p
35.
The FDA is not the only government agency struggling with how to address
SSPA’s. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also been active in the discussion of
health and fitness tracking, and so far, has been just as reluctant to offer official guidance
for consumers or manufacturers. Although the FTC’s stated mission is to protect consumers
against unfair or deceptive business practices, (US Federal Trade Commission, 2015), their
focus in this field has been mainly on data security and not on the impact devices have on
actual consumer health. In 2013 the FTC held a public workshop on the Internet of Things,
which included a panel dedicated to “Connected Health and Fitness” (US Federal Trade
Commission, 2013). The panel moderator began by stating the intended goal of the
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discussion is to explore potential privacy and security risks associated with these devices
(p 164). During the panel, no discussion took place related to protecting consumers from
fraudulent claims made about health and fitness. In a prepared statement released March
22, 2016, the FTC acknowledged that products and services that collect and store health
information raise serious privacy and security concerns for consumers, especially when
these activities take place outside traditional medical contexts not subject to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). However, again, the statement
characterized consumer protection only in terms of preventing fraudulent access to
personal data, with no allusions to protections against bogus health claims (US Federal
Trade Commission, 2016).
This is somewhat surprising given that the FTC has taken legal action numerous
times against businesses making unsubstantiated health claims related to their product. A
recent case charged Focus Education with making false claims about the efficacy of their
online “brain training” product without scientific evidence (US FTC V Focus Education
LLC, 2014). Also in 2014, the FTC ordered that Genelink could no longer make claims to
consumers that their products could treat or prevent particular genetic disease unless these
claims were backed-up by “randomized controlled trials conducted on subjects who have
that genetic variation” (US FTC v Genelink, 2014). The FTC has made similar demands
regarding the requirement that health related claims be backed up by scientific evidence,
ordering that one company producing dietary supplements for weight loss to backup their
claims with “two randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled human clinical studies”
(US FTC v BEIERSDORF, INC, 2011) and demanding another, selling acne treatment,
back their claims up with “competent and reliable scientific evidence” (FTC, 2011).
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As described earlier, there are numerous stakeholder groups involved in the design
and deployment of SSPA (see Figure 1) and, therefore, numerous stakeholders involved in
the activities at each of these levels of ethical analysis. These stakeholders have varying
degrees of influence, as well as a range of perceptions about their own moral
responsibilities for negative (or even positive) social implications that can be traced back
to the technologies. Somewhat ironically, those who are often criticized as being least
likely to claim moral responsibility for social outcomes of emerging technologies are the
best positioned, both professionally and practically, to do so. Professional engineers have
unique expertise and access to the technological processes of SSPA design, and have
demonstrated an ability to adhere to formal and informal codes of ethics that are
specifically constructed to protect public health and welfare (American Society of Civil
Engineers, 2016; American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2016; Association for
Computing Machinery, 2016; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2016;
National Society of Professional Engineers, 2016). The critical role that technology plays
in shaping human behaviors, as well as the moral responsibilities engineers have in shaping
that relationship has received growing recognition in the last few decades (Georgia Tech,
Center for Ethics and Technology, 2016). A recent IEEE publication (Baker, Gandy, &
Zeagler, 2015) offers a “Proposed Collaborative Policy Design Framework” that serves as
a respectable initial step in tackling policy in this domain from the engineering side;
however, it falls short in terms of thinking critically about value and risk for the user.
Baker, Gandy, & Zeagler, describe what they call a “design-thinking” approach
which begins by defining a technological “object” comprised of the mechanical
components, device behaviors, and sociocultural contexts in which it will be used. Once
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the object is defined, a policy analysis would be conducted to identify potential barriers to
development and distribution. Stakeholder input would then be sought to consider user
needs, but it is critical to point out here that “users” in this model are defined as policy
makers, regulators, industry representatives, and other standard setting bodies, not end
users of the technologies themselves. The final step in this proposed framework is to draft
actual policy or return to the initial phase to re-articulate the objectives and outputs of the
objects to “creatively address the potentials of new technologies while avoiding pitfalls
that could derail progression.”
Baker, Gandy, & Zeagler’s framework emphasizes the need for collaboration
between designers of these technologies and the regulatory bodies that govern them. The
clearest “benefit” of this approach is that resulting technologies would be much less likely
to infringe upon or violate existing regulatory standards. Indeed, they suggest that efficacy
will be evident by the “reduced need for regulatory filings, and an expected increase in
non-formal industry and multisector collaborative activities.” The clearest benefactors of
this approach are the developers of the technologies, in the form of streamlining
development and deployment. The framework lays out a process to avoid risk to developers
that could stem from regulatory obstacles, but not risk to end-users from potential outcomes
not already covered by regulatory standards. It focuses on regulatory avoidance and
compliance, while a more robust framework should also incorporate a process to identify
new types of risk to end-users that are not addressed by existing standards, so that design
can be amended to avoid such risks even in the absence of regulatory obstacles. Also
conspicuously absent from the framework is any mention of examining or measuring the
value of a technology to the user either before or after deployment. Nor is their mention of
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approaching users to identify their problems or needs and evaluating whether a
technological approach to addressing the problem or need is even appropriate. A more
recent proposal from Lurie and Mark (2016) discusses these types of concerns and why
engineers, particularly software engineers, should be responsible for thinking about these
factors in design.
The algorithms that drive SSPA’s are rendered to the end-user as “software,” so it
is useful to examine research in the field of ethics and software engineering. In a recent
publication in Science and Engineering Ethics, Lurie and Mark make the case that the
nature of the relationship between the end-user and software engineer warrants a stronger
and more formalized emphasis on ethics-driven software development be incorporated
within the professional standards for this community. Lurie and Mark point out that endusers are increasingly dependent on computer software packages as technologies become
more and more ubiquitous, while at the same time there exists a wide knowledge gap for
the user representing how and why these software packages behave the way they do. The
researchers argue that the outcomes these engineers facilitate are not merely related to
reliability, usability, security, etc., but to the architecture of human interactions with the
world, with each other, and with themselves. These interactions can and do have significant
ethical implication; choices related to algorithm design and the software it constitutes can
impact social norms, freedoms, identity, personal safety, and more. With this in mind, Lurie
and Mark lay out an ethics-driven framework for software development that they argue
will “raise stakeholder awareness about the ethical considerations and implications relevant
to [software development].” They describe five phases of software development and
propose a unique set of yes/no questions for each phase that are ostensibly designed to
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engage the software engineer and the stakeholder client in a conversation about ethical
interventions. However, of the 32 questions they suggest only one that directs the software
engineer to consider end-user impacts:
Is there a procedure in place to define the course of action if, during the planning
requirements phases, it is discovered that fulfilling the customer’s demand will lead
to negative consequences and possibly contradictory and illegal outcomes?
(Question 4 of “Requirements Phase”, p 432).
One other question could be interpreted as being related to ethical implications: “Is
a mechanism in place that distinguishes between a quality product versus a correct
product?” (Question 2 of “Testing and Verification Phase,” p 432). However, the authors
are not clear whether the perception of a “quality product” is meant for the stakeholder
client or the end-user. As with the Baker, Gandy, & Zeagler framework discussed
previously, this framework seems unlikely to promote a user-centered mindset focused on
ethical implications, but instead seems more conducive to removing or avoiding boundaries
to development and deployment. For example, “Has it been determined who makes
decisions on behalf of the client?”; “Has it been determined who approves the budgetary
flexibility for project management?” (p 431). While the goals Lurie and Mark lay out are
laudable, and the argument software engineers should be more responsible in addressing
ethical implications of their craft is well articulated, the framework and sets of questions
they propose fall short in addressing substantive issues related to the ethical implications
of software design.
In a paper describing a set of rules for moral responsibility and computing artifacts
(which includes software and hardware), Miller (2011) made a similar argument to Lurie
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and Mark that "people who design, develop, or deploy a computing artifact are morally
responsible for that artifact, and for the foreseeable effects of that artifact.” He also argues
that this responsibility “includes being answerable for the behaviors of the artifact and for
the artifact’s effects after deployment, to the degree to which these effects are reasonably
foreseeable by that person.” In terms of developing professional standards for the design
of SSPA, it might appear that Miller would argue that a process for considering ethical
implications of the technology should fall within the purview of the software engineer;
however, Miller adds that moral responsibility for computing artifacts also rests with “other
people who design, develop, deploy or knowingly use the artifact as part of a sociotechnical
system.” Effectively, “The Rules,” as Miller describes them, define a shared responsibility
in considering the moral implications of computing artifacts, including end-users.
However, as Lurie and Mark point out, the end-user may not have the knowledge required
to consider and predict the behaviors of SSPA’s and the resulting moral implications. This
puts users, at least, at a disadvantage in exercising their responsibility; this issues is
discussed later in Engineering discipline, page 35.
Some researchers have suggested that independent reviewing organizations should
engage manufacturers of SSPA’s (and technology more broadly) to consider the ethical
implications of these devices regarding consumer behaviors when the device falls outside
the purview of government regulatory bodies (Boulos, Brewer, Karimkhani, Buller, &
Dellavalle, 2014; Sclove, 2010). For example, SocialWellth (formerly Happtique) offers
to vet health related applications and devices that are not otherwise evaluated by the FDA.
They describe their methodology for vetting as:
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“a multidisciplinary review shaped by behavioral science to assess functionality,
consumer appeal, usability and design, privacy and security, content quality,
clinical evidence, cost and other metrics to deliver value to our healthcare sponsors
and end consumers.” (SocialWellth, 2016)
The organization offers a two-year certification for products it evaluates, but the
process is voluntary on the part of manufacturer and success of this approach in protecting
consumers from risk will rely heavily on educating consumers about the value of the
certification process. At the time this research was conducted, the SocialWellth website
offered no information to end-users about what type of protections they would be offered
by seeking out certified products, nor was there an online process to identify if a product
is certified and what that means. The impact of these efforts is difficult to guage as well;
the founder of the company, David Vinson, announced at a 2015 conference that the
company had issued 120 certifications out of 600 applications (Vinson, 2015) since
launching in 2013, but there are more than 165,000 health related apps currently on the
market (McCarthy, 2015). A similar effort by the United Kingdom’s National Health
Service (NHS) attempted to create and curate a Health Apps Library in 2013. However,
after certifying less than 100 apps and failing to properly vet clinical evidence and app
security, the library website was closed two years later (Misra, 2015).
Attempts to guide the design of consumer SSPA’s in a way that protects consumers
have been disconnected, schizophrenic, and unable to keep up with the frenetic pace of
deployment. It is not only unclear who should be responsible for protecting against
unwanted or unintended social impacts, but also who should be thinking about these
impacts. The following sections looks at some of the broader social implications of SSPA’s
that have not been considered in existing literature.
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Social Implications
Vision of the future. As described in the previous section, the development of
regulations and standards for design and deployment of consumer SSPA’s is still in a state
of flux. Given the relatively small market penetration of SSPA’s like the Fitbit and Apple’s
smart watch (Patterson, 2016), coupled with as yet unrealized infiltration of IoT systems
(Atzori, Iera, Morabito; 2010; Swan, 2012b), and modest inroads into harnessing Big Data
(Matzner, 2014), perhaps the existing FDA draft guidelines and the FTC’s limited
involvement may not seem terrible problematic. However, expectations for all of these
technologies are that their use, relevance, and permeation and will grow exponentially in
the coming decades, such that ubiquitous, robust data collection will be pervasive and
powerful (Patterson, 2016; Gibbs, 2015; Hsieh, Komisar, Jazayeri & Yeh, 2016; Swan
2012b). Although this is certainly not a guarantee, efforts to bring this future to a reality
are clear, with government and industry actors working together to pave the way, so it is
critical to consider how current policies and standards would hold up if such a scenario
came to fruition. The remainder of this paper considers the psychological, and
sociopolitical implications of ubiquitous LR-GW SSPA’s with expanded capacities that
are not currently available, but are not prohibited by current standards (for example a LRGW device that can access sensor data from inside the body from a separate moderate to
high-risk medical device such as an implant or consumable).
Self-sensor persuasion bias. To understand the social implications of SSPA’s it is
critical to understand how SSD impact persuasion from a psychological perspective, as this
will no doubt be correlated with commercial industries’ efforts to develop the technology.
To understand the persuasive value of SSD it is helpful to first consider the instrumental
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nature of self-sensor data, i.e. how it is substantively different from other forms of selfknowledge and why is it relevant to decision making? There are a number of sources of
self-knowledge that have been well studied; such as social comparison, introspection,
reflected appraisal, and self-perception. For example, Daryl Bem’s Self-Perception Theory
(1972) postulates “Individuals come to “know” their own attitudes, emotions, and other
internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior
and/or the circumstances in which these behaviors occur.” From a behaviorist framework,
self-knowledge is gained via observation (by the self or by others) and therefore highly
enmeshed in external cues (Skinner, 1974; Bem, 1972). For example, a sensation of feeling
low in energy and cognitively depleted can be interpreted as “run-down” or “tired,” and so
will undoubtedly require the consideration of external factors such as the time of day (e.g.
10 am vs 1 am), social norms (e.g. what others doing the same activities are feeling), and
observations about past behavior (is it unusual to feel this way at this time, within this
context). The more external information that is available the more likely one can “know”
what the feelings of low energy and cognitive depletion mean, but less information can
make understanding these feelings more difficult (for example, not being able to articulate
the physical feelings, or not being able to remember what activities have been going on
recently or how one has felt in this situation in the past). The source of self-sensor data is
neither introspection nor external observation, but rather an external representation of
internal behavior. In the example referred to above, the interpretation of one’s feelings to
mean “run-down” vs “tired” could, in the near future, also be shaped by self-sensor data
about blood cell count, brain wave patterns, and metabolic data (for examples of existing
technologies see Pantelopoulos & Bourbakis, 2010; Patel et al., 2012; and Mukhopadhyay,
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2015). It is true that self-sensor data must be represented externally in order to be viewed,
but it is not “merely” external at that point. This form of external observation of internal
behavior does not easily plug into existing models of decision making, persuasion, attitude
formation, etc. In addition, it is not known whether variations in the external representation
(e.g. gamified, medicalized, highly branded, etc.) of self-sensor data will impact decision
making.
Another front on which SSPA’s pose a risk to users is in the types of attitudes and
behaviors SSPA’s can be directed toward. Again, while the development of SSPA’s in the
healthcare industry may be arguably guided by beneficence and restricted in scope to
addressing attitudes and behaviors closely linked to biological and psychological wellbeing, the development of consumer SSPA’s is less clearly defined. Consumer SSPA’s
aimed at influencing decision making about things users have no strong feelings about
(daily tasks, some social trends, low information situations, etc.) will likely be appealing
to consumers and, at the same time, are more likely to be based on peripheral cues or
heuristics, which require less cognitive resources (Chaiken, 1980). In this case, a consumer
model for SSPA design could use SSD to nudge a user toward certain behaviors by
targeting decision making that the user is already primed to use peripheral cues for (such
as choosing between two unknown brands). This approach harnesses the persuasive value
afforded by the attentional effects of self-sensor data (see PART 2, p 51) and, by targeting
ambivalent or indifferent attitudes, maximizes the persuasive value of SSD qualities such
as expertise, simplicity, etc. The degree to which SSD could unduly bias users is unknown
and may, admittedly, even be inconsequential, but given the amount of research being
invested in developing effective SSPA’s to influence user behaviors, its seems prudent to
31

understand if such a risk exists. This issue of the persuasive value of SSD in SSPA design
is covered extensively in see PART 2, p 51.
Algorithmic responsibility. Knowing whether SSD may bias a user’s decision
making processes is critical in understanding future risks to users who may rely on such
information to make what they believe to be informed decisions. However, it is crucial to
point out that the risks lie not within the bias to “trust” self-monitoring sensor data alone,
nor within the raw data itself of course, but rather, within how sensor data is captured,
processed, and presented to each user by other actors. In other words, while raw data
collected through my own “sensors” (i.e. eyes, ears, nose, etc.) is made meaningful through
my cognitive processing (and the life experiences that have shaped them), raw data from
sensors embedded in self-monitoring devices are first processed and made meaningful by
someone else –through the engineering of the devices and software used to render the data
to me. For example, to produce a digital photograph, many actors are involved in creating
protocols to process visual sensor data collected from a scene before it can finally be
viewed. At each step, decisions are made about how to achieve the “best” end result, but
the connotation and operationalization of the “best” end result may vary from actor to actor
– i.e. truest color, lowest energy usage, most profitable, etc. Each goal can shape how
sensor data is processed and rendered. For the end user, variations from one group of actors
to another mean a picture taken on one camera could look subtly or even drastically
different taken on another, even though the same raw data (the original scene) existed for
each. As with the design of a camera, the raw data from self-sensor technologies can be
captured and rendered to the users in many different ways. This highlights the need to
understand the role of “algorithmic responsibility” in SSPA design.
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Interestingly, many of the predicted benefits for the use of SSPA’s can also be
envisioned as risks when contextualized differently. Consider using a SSPA as a basic
fitness app meant to guide a user’s choices about diet and activity. Assuming the basis on
which the prescriptives are derived is reliable, benefits could include increased physical
fitness, lower risk of diet related illness, increased longevity, improved sense of well-being,
less time off from work, and so on. However, if the SSPA is developed using less reliable
information to derive prescriptives, and corporate or organizational goals take precedent
over user goals (such as selling products or services, changing employee behavior, etc.)
these benefits may be replaced by risks such as poor diet choices, overspending, increase
insurance/healthcare costs, etc. (Sadowski, 2014, Swan 2012b). In this example, risks and
benefits vary as a function of algorithm design.
An algorithm (or set of algorithms) essentially performs as a decision engine from
which prescriptives are derived. There are a number of stakeholders involved in defining
the logic, parameters, and function of these decision engines; from the group or individual
responsible for initiating the technology, to the final application developer responsible for
rendering the prescriptives to the users in a way that is visually appealing. First, the
stakeholders initiating the SSPA technology must define how the sensor data input will
lead to each inference and/or prescriptive. This means choosing scientific findings that
inform what particular sensor readings (or thresholds) mean to the diagnostic or symptom
management plan involved and then defining what the outcomes should be when those
readings are inputted to the SSPA via a sensor device. While the health care industry is,
generally speaking, accountable to standards that encourage these algorithmic designs be
based in scientific theory (Lewis, Eysenbach, Jimison , Kukafka, & Stavri, 2005, pp14333

149), there is no similar accountability structure for consumer SSPA’s (i.e. LR-GW). This
is not meant to imply that consumer SSPA’s can only generate positive outcomes if
grounded in formalized sciences, but rather to point out that without an authority to oversee
the validity of commercial SSPA claims made about what sensor data “mean,” there is little
consumer protection against fraudulent or harmful claims.
Looking at the development of wearable technologies designed to detect
concussions provides an example of how this process can become subjective. Diagnosing
a concussion is multistep, complex process that requires a medical caregiver to use their
best judgments based on existing knowledge, past experiences, and the totality of the
circumstances. Though there are certain best practices that have been put forth by the
medical community for diagnosing concussion (Greenberg, M.K. et al. 1997; Randolph, et
al., 2009; Scorza, Raleigh, &. O’Connor, 2012), the process has not been distilled into a
finite and objective set of rules (Scorza, Raleigh, & O’Connor, 2012). More specifically, it
is not clear what type and magnitude of force causes a concussion (Hernandez, et al., 2015).
Nonetheless there are multiple wearables available (or coming to market shortly) that are
being marketed as concussion detectors, such as the Joltsensor© and the Hiji band©. The
SSPA for the Hiji band© uses collision force measurements from the wearable and
observational data inputted by the users or observer (such as a coach or parent) to “catch
any sports related head impacts and allow the injury to be identified and assessed,”
(Hijiband.com, 2015). The SSPA for the Joltsensor works in the same manner and claims
it will “notify the user of a possible concussion,” and will help athletes “train smarter and
safer” and “make smarter more timely decisions” (Joltsensor.com, 2015). In order to do
what these apps claim to do, a decision engine comprised of finite and objective parameters
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has to be created (e.g. acceleration speeds between A and B at time of collision result in
this action if age is ≤X but ≥Y, and weight is more than Z, or more than X items from list
A =Y). (Hernandez, et al., 2015). The qualifications of these stakeholders and the quality
of the information they make use of may vary wildly from one SSPA to another; not only
because there is no regulatory process to guide these decisions, but also because there is
disagreement even within the medical community about what exactly these parameters
should be.
Social control. Even if a method to determine whether the algorithm design of a
SSPA was “ethical” could be developed and research showed that SSD convey just the
“right” amount of persuasive power, there are other social implications that may negatively
impact the rights and freedom of users that have not been considered in current discourse
surrounding SSPA design. The languages and credibilities of engineering and medicine
that are used to sell SSPA’s are linked to overlapping phenomena related to social control.
On one hand, the invocation of heuristics of wisdom and benevolence related to healthcare
and medicine may lead to what is referred to as medicalization of wellness or the social
construction of illness. On the other hand, the invocation of objectivity and predictability
related to engineering may lead to automaticity of self-awareness. These two aspects are
discussed next.
Engineering discipline. SSPA’s have the potential to act as the ultimate tool in selfsurveillance of the body – from its location in time and space, to the location of electrons
in its brain, and from the construction of muscles to the construction of identity. While
some argue that this ability to monitor and observe every aspect of the body creates an
opportunity for individuals to control their own health outcomes (Hofmann, 2016),
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philosopher and social theorist Michael Foucault’s writing about “the political technology
of the body” suggests that this ability to know and control the body can be used as a form
of subjugation and discipline (Foucault, 1977). He argues:
“subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of violence or ideology; it can
also be direct, physical, pitting force against force, bearing on material elements,
and yet without involving violence; it may be calculated, organized, technically
thought out; it may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet
remain of a physical order. That is to say, there may be a “knowledge” of the body
that is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is
more than the ability to conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute
what might be called the political technology of the body.” (p 26)

The emerging IoT and Big Data economies offer unprecedented knowledge about
bodies and objects moving in the world, and SSPA’s offer unprecedented access to the
body qua body; from that knowledge emerges the ability to calculate, organize, and direct
–to conquer. Foucault argues that the constitution and control of this political technology
of the body is complex, diffuse, and “not localized in the relations between the state and
its citizens,” (p27). However, as Lurie and Mark (2016) argue, increased dependence on
these technologies is correlated with an increased gap in understanding how technologies
work; this puts users at a disadvantage in terms of constituting and controlling this political
technology of the body. The knowledge gap is related to issues of complexity, as well as
issue of access. Numerous strategies exist to ensure citizens do not have access to the
algorithmic rules that calculate, organize, and direct the body. Pasquale (2015) argues there
are three main approaches to protecting an organization’s privacy; real secrecy locks up
algorithm by preventing users from accessing the code, while legal secrecy uses
36

government sanctioned rules to protect manufacturers and developers from having to share
proprietary information. The third approach, obfuscation, floods the user with too much
information or distracts them from thinking critically about the nature of the claims being
made. Langdon Winner (1983) argues that technologies “provide structure for human
activity,” and this is intimately true for technologies that construct our understanding of
the body and mind. SSPA’s aimed at externalizing internal mechanism of behavior provide
a pathway for decisions once based on personal reflection to be based on standardized and
automatic processes. The standardization may be constructed with deep reflection about
human values and social norms in a good faith effort to improve the human condition –or
not. If SSPA’s can be thought of as forms of life as Winner argues, users are prohibited or
at least significantly impeded from knowing the sociotechnical identity and value systems
from which these forms of life are born. Instead, the status quo for characterizing SSPA’s
misrepresents these technologies as objective, value-neutral technologies that facilitate
some notion of the good life.
Foucault also describes the notion of docility, which is ultimately tied to subjection
of the body, and institutional interests in techniques to exploit the body as an object and
target of power. Foucault argues that this exploitation of the body has taken place
throughout recorded history, but unique changes to approaching docility emerged around
the 18th Century (p. 134). What is chilling in his descriptions of these changes is how the
affordances of SSPA’s are so well suited to the same purposes in terms of “scale of control”
and “modality.”
1. …there was the scale of the control: it was a question not of treating the
body, en masse, ‘wholesale’, as if it were an indissociable unity, but of
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working it ‘retail’, individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of
obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself - movements,
gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body. (p.
136)
2. …there is the modality: it implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion,
supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result and it is
exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible
time, space, movement. (p. 137)
Foucault referred to these methods of “meticulous control of the operations of the
body” as “disciplines” and noted their use and legacy in not only penal institutions, but in
schools, hospitals, and the military, as well as in non-governmental and commercial
organizations such as factories and workshops (p 137). These techniques of discipline are
omnipresent and habitualized in our cultural institutions today, and so may go unnoticed.
One can see this scale of individuality and the modality of constant surveillance in times
of disease outbreaks and terrorist threat when citizens fully expect the state to seek docility
and therefore the application of ambient sensors, SSD, and other monitoring technologies
are intentionally transparent. When this same approach to docility is used to limit economic
choices such as determining which health insurance options are presented to a person based
on SSD, it is likely to be much less transparent. (A report from the technology market
research firm Gartner, Inc. (2016) estimates that by 2018 more than 2 million employees
will be required to wear health and fitness tracking devices as a condition of employment.)
A challenge with not only SSPA’s, but much of the monitoring technologies employed
today is that citizens often enter into these technological platforms with an expectation of
personalized benefit, so rather than docility, it can be “experienced” as empowerment. The
difference between the two may or may not be merely perceptual, but again, to the extent
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that SSPA’s are not currently scrutinized as a political technology of the body, they offer
an exceptional opportunity for exploitation by those in positions of power with the privilege
of knowledge. Table 2 shows examples of slogan and taglines from popular wearables that
position the role of SSPA’s as an objective tool that empowers the user to control physical
and mental well-being through quantification of the body.
Foucault also argues that in addition to exerting power over life through
subjection and docility, a second form of power began to emerge in the late 17th century
through the rapid introduction of interventions and regulations to manage populations
through quantification and control of biological processes (such as control of birth rates,
life expectancy, living conditions, and level of health) (Foucault & Hurley, 1978).
Foucault referred to the ability to control these forces as “bio-power;” and argues that as
western nation states develop so does the breadth and depth of control over human
biological functions and its use as a tool for the maximization of productivity. While
discipline is used to direct human behavior at the individual level, “bio-power” is used to
direct a population of people (i.e. the residents of a city, state, or nation for example) to
behave in a desired fashion. SSPA’s present new methods for quantification and control
Foucault could never have imagined; with biological and behavioral data constantly
being collected then transmitted across networks, returning precise prescriptives for the
user or users.

Medicalization and social control. Medicalization is a term used typically in the
social sciences to critically describe the process of expansion of medical authority “beyond
a legitimate boundary,” (Rose, 2007a) “into the domains of everyday existence,” (Metzl &
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Hertzig, 2007) and “over our bodies through the reduction of social phenomena to
individual biological pathologies,” (Fainzang, 2013). Medicalization occurs through an
exploitation of knowledge and power. The social control afforded by medicalizations
“comes from having the authority to define certain behaviors, persons, and things,”
(Conrad, 1979) and subjection of the body (Foucault, 1977). This encompasses the ability

TableError! Bookmark not
defined. 2
Slogan and taglines from wearables that connect well-being with self-quantification.
Name

Style

Purpose

Quote

Moova

Bracelet

Fitness
Coaching

“You can't improve what you can't measure”

Samsung GearS2b

Watch

Fitness
Coaching

“Taking charge of your health is easy with
Gear S2. Track your daily activity levels,
heart rate and water vs. caffeine intake.”

Emotiv Musec

Headset

Neuromonitor

“Monitor cognitive load and discover
emotional responses that are preventing you
from achieving peak mental performance.”

Emotiv Insightc

Headset

Neuromonitor

“Our brains are at the very center of our
health and performance. Self assessment and
cognitive training is a crucial part of our
wellbeing. The Emotiv Insight offers a cost
effective and highly powerful solution for self
assessment.”

Athosd

Clothing

Fitness
Coaching

“Smart performance apparel that monitors
your biosignals and distills them into
meaningful insights.”

Clothing +e

Clothing

Fitness
Coaching

“When Accurate Data and Every Moment
Matters” (overlaid on an image of infant
sleeping).

Fitbitf

Bracelet

Fitnes
Coaching

“Fitbit tracks every part of your dayincluding activity,exercise, food, weight and s
leep- to help you find your fit, stay motivated,
and see how small steps make a big impact.”
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Sources: aMoov. 2016; bSamsung, 2016; cEmotiv, 2016; dLiveAthos, 2016; eClothingplus,
2016; fFitbit, 2016.

to define who can work, who can go to school, who can move around, who can reproduce,
who can be held responsible for actions, and who can be considered ‘good’. One of the
earliest and most prominent scholars to formalize the notion of medicalization was Ivan
Illich, in his book Medical Nemesis (1976), in which he attributed the problem of
medicalization primarily to physicians. More recent discourse in the field however, argues
that private pharmaceutical companies are responsible for the continued expansion of
medical authority (Clark, 2014; Goldacre, 2013; Moynihan & Henry, 2006; Poitras &
Meredith, 2008) through their efforts to manufacture illness for existing drugs. This same
mechanism of medicalization could be used to expand the consumer SSPA industry by
applying biomedical models to “general wellness,” and by establishing medical narratives
for normativity that don’t explicitly claim to diagnose illness, but rather seek to quantify
wellness medically. The economic gains would come not through prescriptions for drugs
or medical tests, but through the consumption of lifestyle products aimed to modulate
degrees of wellness. For example, the healthy user whose SSPA monitors heart rate, skin
conductivity, blood volume, etc. may be advised that his readings are in the second
percentile for his age and weight and that following a particular set of actions (determined
by the manufacture) will help elevate him to status quo. That might be great; perhaps the
SSPA will advise the user to think about exercising more and eating healthier. But, the
healthy user has given the SSPA manufacturer the opportunity to evaluate, categorize, and
advise his level of healthiness which, even if it is well and good, may have just became
subpar based on standards and knowledge that are not transparent. In this case,
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medicalization is used to make something real or relevant by identifying it as a biological
phenomenon (Clark, 2014), but this may or may not benefit the recipient of this newly
constructed reality. Medicalizations and the technological solutions they offer are
appealing to consumers because they offer simple and objective explanations and responses
focused on the individual (take this pill, apply this paste) for complex, subjective
phenomenon. SSPA’s offer the ultimate impersonation of personal control.
A classic example of medicalization is the construction of “chronic halitosis” (CH).
Bad breath existed as a symptom of underlying disease, poor dental hygiene, or love of
smelly food for centuries before the invention of CH. Perhaps more often than not it was
simply considered a common, perhaps annoying state that the malodorous owner never
even recognized. Mouthwash existed for decade before CH too; however, lackluster sales
of Lambert Pharmaceutical’s “Listerine” mouthwash, prompted the company’s marketing
team to embark on an emotional advertising campaign to create the perception of a serious
medical problem for which they had the cure. By adding the inherently chilling adjective
“chronic” to the Latin word “halitosis” (which loosely translates to “breath disease”), the
advertising team created a story of a terrible condition that few people knew they had and
others were too embarrassed to tell them; a silent killer of social standing. The increase in
sales of Listerine from approximately $100,000 in 1920 and 1921 to more than $4 million
in 1927 is often attributed to this medicalization of bad breath (Marchand, 1985; Munsey,
2006). This medicalization did not result from physicians overstepping their bounds, or
from patient advocacy groups calling for treatment, but rather from private industry
motivated by economic interest rather than genuine healthcare concerns, acting with the
language and credibilities of the medical field.
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An intersection of medicalization and SSPA design that is particularly problematic
is within the domain of mental health. While the most highly visible examples of SSPA’s
are in the fitness industry, developers are making inroads to mental health and acuity. There
are already a number of LR-GW SSPA’s that claim to monitor and trace biometric data
associated with mood. For example, using primarily electroencephalography (EEG)
readings the Emotiv Insight headset claims to “6 different emotional and sub-conscious
dimensions in real time – Excitement (Arousal), Interest (Valence), Stress (Frustration),
Engagement/Boredom, Attention (Focus) and Meditation (Relaxation),” (Emotiv, Inc.
2016). However, the quantitative boundaries of mental states and mental wellness are far
from well-defined (Beaulieu, 2002; Ulman, Cakar, & Yildiz, 2014; Uttal, 2012). Even the
subjective boundaries of mental health (i.e. observable behavioral symptoms) are moving
targets from one iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders1
to another. There are strong economic interests for pharmaceutical companies to expand
the boundaries of mental “illness” through medicalization of social problems, and this is a
critical issue in 21st century bioethics discourse (Poitras & Meredith, 2008; Moynihan &
Henry, 2006; Goldacre, 2013) that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, huge
economics gains could also exist for “lifestyle” related retailers who are able to use the
language of SSPA’s to implicitly medicalize and quantify mental “wellness” and, in turn,
prescribe treatments that control or exploit users by guiding their purchases and activities

1

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders is currently published by the American
Psychiatric Association which lists all classifications of mental disorders. The first official publication in
1921 contained 22 diagnoses. From one iteration to the next, diagnoses of mental illness may be added,
expanded, narrowed, and/or dropped. The most current publication contains more than 250 diagnoses
(American Psychiatric Association, 2016)
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Not every social scientist believes that medicalization is negative, and some see
ubiquitous monitoring of physiological data as a way to democratize healthcare. Hofmann
(2016) writes that this type of pervasive medicalization, “making ordinary life experiences
subject to medical attention to measuring every aspect of life, and thereby making it subject
to ‘experience,’ attention and control … makes persons themselves control their own
lives.” However, this is a technocentric view of pervasive ubiquitous self-sensoring data –
one that ascribe a value-neutral quality that does not currently exist. It ignores the situated
and embedded nature of how understandings of these data are constructed. It assumes a
level of individual understanding, critical thinking, and attention on behalf of the user that
is not practical. This is not to suggest that users do not have the intellectual capacity to
understand the terabytes of raw sensor data that they could be faced with on a daily basis,
but that all of this information will be useless to the user if they don’t have the time to
process it to make meaningful observations. As soon as a technological solution intervenes
to assist with this processing (as SSPA’s would do), the designers of that technology
automatically, even if inadvertently, infuse their own cultural, political, and economic
interests into that interpretation. Hoffman acknowledges that the epistemic challenge in a
new frontier of ubiquitous SSD is in this process of validation and selection of relevant
data to make sense of it for a particular user. But at least right now, this is most definitely
not in the control of the users. These limits are not only validated and selected by those
who develop SSPA’s, but the subjective definitions and characteristics of “normal” may
be constructed through the self-serving story telling of small-time entrepreneurs selling
their wears on KickStarter and Peerbacker to multi-layered conglomerates with big
marketing budgets.
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Free will and prosocial behavior. Even if every SSPA was designed with
benevolence and transparency, omnipresent and robust monitoring of the physiological self
may still have numerous unintended consequences. One of these is the activation of certain
beliefs related to free will and determinism which have been shown to have numerous
negative impacts on individual behavior. Definitions of free will vary, but generally tend
to refer to an individual’s belief in their ability to make deliberate choices and to believe
that they are responsible for those choices (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005;
Monroe and Malle, 2010). The following section highlights experimental research as
evidence of the possible social impacts of altering individual beliefs through priming and
draws attention to how SSPA’s may contribute to altering these beliefs.
Research by Mueller and Dweck (1998) was meant to examine the impact of praise
on learning and motivation, but their findings also implied that deterministic beliefs could
lead to negative behavioral outcomes. The researchers conducted a series of 6 studies in
which children completed learning tasks with various degrees of difficulty; designed in
such a way to ensure success during the first tasks and failure during a later task. They
found that providing praise to the children on the first task that attributed their success to
either natural intellect or to hard work, the childrens’ effort and attitude toward a
subsequent, more difficult task changed in a predictable manner. When faced with the
difficult task, children who had been given praise that attributed their earlier success to
their natural intellect showed numerous negative effects, including reduced effort, poorer
performance, reduced motivation and confidence, and decreased enjoyment. Mueller and
Dweck did not attempt to interpret their findings in terms of determinism or free will
beliefs, but an argument can be made that the innate qualities associated with “intelligence”
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mean that praise for intelligence primes a deterministic world view (at least in so far as it
is relevant to the task at hand which was related to learning).
Vohs and Schooler (2008) conducted a more direct examination of the effects of
priming deterministic2 beliefs on behavioral outcomes. While Mueller and Dweck’s study
demonstrated that attributing outcomes to innate qualities rather than learned behaviors
(such as hard work) had a negative impact on personal effort and motivation, Vohs and
Schooler examined whether priming “anti-free-will” beliefs could lead to overt negative
moral behaviors. Participants were asked to read a series of statements that either supported
a belief in free will, refuted such a belief, or were neutral in nature. Participants then
completed a set of problems in reading, math, logic, and reasoning and were told they
would receive $1 per correct answer. In some conditions of the experiment participants
were presented with an opportunity to cheat by grading their own answers. Results showed
that participants who read the deterministic statements and were given an opportunity to
cheat took home more money than all other participants.
In addition to Vohs and Schooler’s 2008 study numerous others have explored how
beliefs in free will and determinism impact attitude and behavior. Baumeister, Masicampo,
& Dewall (2009) found that when participants read a series of statements promoting
disbelief in free will they were less likely to provide help in a hypothetical scenario than
participants who read neutral statements. They also found that priming disbelief in free will
increased aggression against an innocent target. In another study, MacKenzie, Vohs, and

Vohs and Schooler (2008) did not specifically define the relationship between “free will” and
“determinism,” but the two terms are treated similarly to antonyms in the paper, such that a prime
characterized as “anti-free-will” was also characterized as “deterministic.” Some philosophers argue that
this is not necessarily the case (Campbell, 1996; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005).
2
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Baumeister (2014) found a relation between belief in free will and gratitude. Disbelief in
free will tended to reduce feelings of gratitude for hypothetical favors, past events, and a
real favor. This is likely explained by the foundational role free will is thought to play in
determining moral responsibility (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005).
While research has demonstrated that belief in free will can influence behavior and
perception, to understand how this is related to SSPA’s it is important to understand what
environmental cues may reduce or enhance this belief. The research described so far has
typically employed written prompts, but other researchers have demonstrated that less
explicit cues play a role as well. For example, Feldman, Baumeister, and Wong (2014)
found that belief in free will is related in a number of ways to an individual’s perceived
ability to make choices. In their study they found that participants who had been asked to
recall past choices and the decisions made from those choices during a specific time period
had stronger beliefs in free will relative to participants asked only to recall specific actions
they had taken during a similar time period. In the same study they found that asking
participants to make simple choices (in this case, choosing between different pen types)
also increased belief in free will relative to participants who were asked instead to perform
a series of simple actions.
Consumer SSPA’s monitor and process a user’s sensor data and implicitly or
explicitly direct their actions based on this data. This research suggests that how these
directives are presented to the users could impact that user’s belief in free will. Directives
presented as a choice between two or more actions would be less likely to reduce the user’s
belief in free will than directives presented as a single command. For example, a SSPA that
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informs a user his potassium is low could suggest the user take one of three actions (e.g.
eat a banana, drink a glass of fat free milk, take a supplement) rather than one.
Even more relevant to the discussion of free will and SSPA is research conducted
by Ent and Baumeister (2014) regarding physical states of the body and belief in free will.
The perception of conscious control over one’s bodily actions could be considered a form
of “evidence” to strengthen belief in free will (Wegner and Wheatly, 1999), but what
happens when control of the body’s actions seems difficult or impossible? Ent and
Baumeister first compared the strengths of belief in free will between individuals with
medical conditions that cause physical symptoms beyond conscious control (epilepsy and
panic disorders) and individuals who did not have these medical conditions. They found
that participants who had epilepsy and participants who had a panic disorder had weaker
beliefs in free will than participants who had neither condition. In a follow up study they
found that more temporary states of the body can also affect belief in free will. Participants
were first asked about their beliefs in free will and were subsequently asked about the
intensity of some of their physical needs at that moment, including urination, sexual desire,
fatigue, thirst, and hunger. They found that participants who had reported more intense
needs for urination, sexual desire, or fatigue had expressed weaker beliefs in free will. For
hunger, they found that this was also the case for individuals who were not currently
dieting3. Ent and Baumeister interpret their broader findings as evidence that physical states
can influence belief in free will. Further extrapolation suggests that the less control a person
has over those physical states, the weaker belief in free will (see Footnote 4).

3

For individuals who were dieting, more intense hunger was correlated with stronger belief in free will.
The researchers suggested this is because these participants were more likely to be actively engaging in
control over hunger which is an expression of free will (Ent & Baumeister, 2014).
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Ent and Baumeister do not specify whether they believe physical states impact
belief in free will because the physical sensations create an unconscious awareness of those
states (i.e. the stronger the sensation the weaker the belief) or whether reminding a person
about their physical state of the past may have a similar effect even in the absence of
sensations. In their second study, Ent and Baumeister asked participants about physical
states that are typically associated with sensations that the participants could have been
experiencing at the time (e.g. hunger pains, fullness of bladder). However, in their first
study it is not known whether participants who identified as having a current or past
diagnosis of epilepsy or a panic disorders had been experiencing physical sensations at the
time they completed the online study or if, instead, the effect was a result of those
participants having been reminded about these physical states by being ask to identify as
having that particular diagnosis in order to participate. Because of the disruptive nature of
seizure disorders and panic disorders, intuitively it seems reasonable to believe that most
participants would not have been experiencing major symptoms at the time they completed
the study. What this suggests is that reminding participants about physical states that are
beyond a person’s control may also weaken belief in free will. This is particularly relevant
to the discussion of the social impacts of SSPA’s, because they are specifically designed
to unmask the hidden nature of our internal states. Being reminded (whether through
physical sensations or environmental cues) that our free will must sometimes be trumped
by our physical needs is an integral part of the human experience and, since most people
maintain a belief in free will (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005; Monroe and
Malle, 2010), the weakening effects are likely transitory as these reminders come and go.
But ubiquitous SSPA’s offer an unprecedented opportunity to remind users of the countless
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physiological states of the body that change without willful intent. In this light, SSPA’s
may serve to continually depress belief in free will, even those that are genuinely meant to
improve general wellness.
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PART 2 - INTRODUCTION
One of the primary objectives of this dissertation research was to conduct an
experimental investigation into the impact of self-sensoring prescriptive applications
(SSPA’s) on decision making and attitude formation within a non-medical care framework.
Although most of the research dedicated to changing behavior through the use of SSPA
has occurred within a healthcare context, commercial use of biosensors is growing rapidly
(Research and Markets, 2014; TechNavio, 2014) and little is known about how this form
of information will act to guide consumer choices. It is also difficult to make inferences
about the persuasive impacts of SSPA’s in the consumer industry by simply looking to
research from healthcare applications of SSPA, because, relative to the vast quantity of
research energies invested in developing self-sensor driven health care technology and
infrastructure behaviors (Pantelopoulos & Bourbakis, 2010; Research and Markets, 2014;
Song, et al., 2014; TechNavio, 2014), very little research has been dedicated to evaluating
and understanding the effectiveness of such technologies in terms of improved medical
outcomes and decreased costs.
SSPA’s developed for healthcare settings in which the devices would be used to
treat or diagnose diseases or medical conditions must be approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to assure safety, efficacy, and security. This process can be costly
and time consuming for manufacturers, with little guarantee of future market share.
Recently the FDA released a non-binding set of guidelines for “low-risk general wellness”
(LR-GW) devices that would not be subject to FDA oversight (Food & Drug
Administration, 2016; also, see Ethics, Regulation, and Policy, p 11). Consumer SSPA’s
marketed to help users with general advice about fitness, relaxation, sleep, etc. may be
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considered LR-GW devices and therefore would not need to wade through clinical trials to
prove efficacy. This path of least resistance incentivizes developers of sensor technologies
and SSPA to focus more on these LR-GW devices. This means more devices entering the
consumer market with no regulatory motivations for manufacturers to dedicate resources
to understanding how strongly self-sensor data (SSD) impacts attitudes and behaviors. This
is particularly important because it is not known whether self-sensor data may bias a user
to believe certain claims or advice regardless of the intellectual or scientific merits of the
“general advice” produced by this category of SSPA devices. Several theories related to
decision making and attitude formation suggest physiological self-sensor data could be
particularly alluring in terms of persuasiveness. What follows is a brief overview of four
areas of research related to persuasion and what they suggest about the potential impact of
SSPA’s on attitude formation and behavior.
Message tailoring. The study of “message tailoring” offers some interesting
insight into what we might expect from self-sensor data in terms of persuasion and behavior
change. Tailoring a message means that the content, context, or method of delivery is
partially determined by specific information about the particular individual for whom the
message is intended. This is typically done to enhance the value or persuasiveness of a
message and it is found to be more effective than group-targeted messaging or mass
messaging (Hawkins, Kreuter, Resnicow, Fishbein, & Dijkstra, 2008; Noar, Benac, &
Harris, 2007). While there is no universally accepted theory to explain the persuasiveness
of message tailoring, a number of researchers suggest that it is likely related to increased
attention and depth of processing (e.g. Hawkins, et al., 2008; Ho & Chau, 2013; Rimer &
Kreuter, 2006; Ruiter, Kessels, Jansma, & Brug, 2006).
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In a direct examination of attention and tailored messaging, Ruiter, Kessels,
Jansma, & Brug (2006) asked participants to read an interventional message about nutrition
while simultaneously participating in an auditory attention task. EEG measurements
indicated that participants presented with a tailored message (which included personallyrelevant information collected from a previous meeting) dedicated less attentional
resources4 to the auditory task than participants presented with an untailored message. The
researchers argue that the decrease in attention to the auditory tasks was most likely the
result of increased attention to the tailored message. Participants in the tailored message
condition also evaluated the interventional message as being more personally relevant and
were more likely to indicate they intended to change their future diet.
There is a strong narrative within the literature surrounding tailored messaging that
tailored information increases attention by activating personal relevance, which increases
motivation to process the message, leading to attitude change (Hawkins, et al., 2008; Ho
& Chau, 2013; Rimer & Kreuter, 2006; Ruiter, et al., 2006). In this narrative tailored
information leads to what Petty and Cacioppo (1986) define as a “central processing” or
careful thought about a persuasive message. Arguably, self-sensor data is the ultimate form
of message tailoring data, so a logical inference might be that it will similarly serve as a
central cue, activating the same central route to persuasion. In theory, this should allay
concerns that SSPA designers could use self-sensor data inappropriately (e.g. to support a
persuasive message that is actually unrelated to the data) because, as a central cue, it should
elicit thoughtful, critical thinking about the message that would then undermine the dubious

4

Using EEG technology, the researchers measured changes in N100 and P300 event-related potential (which are
thought to measure auditory attention) to infer attention reallocation to a secondary task.
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persuasive attempt. However, while the notion that tailoring increases motivation to
process a message deeply may be valid, Petty and Cacioppo also argue that in order for a
person to do so he or she must also have the ability to process and understand the
information being presented.
This ability is moderated by numerous factors including distraction,
comprehension, background knowledge, obfuscation, etc. (e.g. Osterhouse & Brock, 1970;
Eagly, 1974; Eagly & Warren, 1976). If ability is low, the individual may be unable or
unwilling to think deeply about the argument and may defer to available “peripheral cues”
instead; cues that are not necessarily related directly to the message (e.g. characteristic of
the messenger, etc.). These peripheral cues activate heuristics or mental shortcuts rather
than an active thinking process (also referred to as the heuristic approach by Chaiken, 1980)
and the attitude changes they create are often temporary and less helpful in predicting future
behavior than attitude changes arrived at via the central route (Cialdini, Levy, Herma,
Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976; Petty, Barden, & Wheeler, 2002). Research into the efficacy of
message tailoring has so far typically made use of individualized data and accompanying
arguments that are purposefully easy to understand (e.g. simply restating information that
the individual supplied earlier) and directly relevant to the persuasive message (e.g.
referencing the individual’s daily caloric intake with his nutrition goals). This makes it
difficult to know how novel self-sensor data such as respiration rates, brain wave function,
blood cell count, etc. will (or will not) promote a central route to persuasion, especially
when the highly tailored information is not clearly linked to the persuasive message (e.g.
will personal brain wave data be useful in convincing someone to start taking an antacid?).
Arguably, without the ability to understand the biological implications of the self-sensor
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data it may merely serve as a peripheral cue that represents something about the message
or messenger, (e.g. complexity, expertise, “scienciness”), but one in which the user is
particularly motivated to notice because it is highly tailored. Looking to literature related
to scientific rhetoric and credibility, there are a number of reasons to suggest that selfsensor data that is perceived to be highly tailored, but is nonetheless difficult for the user
to process, may afford it an undue degree of persuasiveness.
Scientific rhetoric and credibility. The language used to describe the way SSPA’s
collect and produce information, such as “quantify,” “measure,” “track,” etc. and, perhaps
most importantly, the word “sensor” itself, all impart a certain essence of reality. This
language allies itself with the language used by many cultures to explain how humans
collect “factual” data about the self, others, and the environment; that is, we rely on our
own “sensors” such as the eyes, nose, ears, etc. to “know” things. While we also rely on
context, the environment, and others to interpret the meaning of these sensory observations,
so long as we believe our sensors to be in good working order, we perceive their data to be
a “reality.”
In addition to the language used to characterize SSD, framing SSD to users as a
“scientific” measure of an internal state may also boost its credibility, whether warranted
or not. Dumit (1999) found a number of examples from court cases in which it appeared
that laypersons tend to put more faith in information they believe to be obtained from a
“scientific mechanism” than information from a more subjective source. Further, Keil,
Lockhart, & Schlegel (2010) found that biological explanations of behavior are perceived
to be more complex and scientific than psychological explanations. Dumit argues that this
bias in thinking is because insight derived from mechanism of hard science are perceived
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to be “culturally objective” (Dumit, 1999). If SSD are afforded this characteristic of
objectivity, this raises the question of whether this would bias a user to incorrectly believe
that prescriptives derived from SSD are also culturally objective.
Beliefs about the perceived messenger conveying the data can also influence
persuasiveness. Aristotle argued that an essential factor in any persuasive attempt is the
trustworthiness of the speaker (Aristotle & Kennedy, 1991, pp 27-35). Not trustworthiness
strictly in the sense that one might trust a computer to consistently calculate correct
solutions to a math problem, but in the sense of the speaker’s perceived character traits
such as wisdom, virtue, and good will (p 112). Aristotle claimed that a speaker perceived
to possess all three of these qualities would be “necessarily persuasive” (p113).
In the case of SSPA’s, a user’s perceptions about who the “speaker” is ought to be
complex because there are indeed many actors involved in the construction of the message,
with many different social and economic goals in mind. This is explored further in Ethics,
Regulation, and Policy, p 11; also see Figure 1) in terms of the complexity of regulatory
policies; in terms of perceptions about the “speaker” the issue is equally nebulous. Some
of these players include the engineers who design the sensors, those who design the
algorithms, the researchers who construct the “evidence” knowledgebase from which the
algorithms are defined, those who fund product development, the benefactors of the
behavioral outcomes for the which the SSPA would be responsible for, and so on. The
user’s awareness of these actors and his beliefs about what their roles and motivations are
will shape the user’s perceptions about the “speaker.” However, without a requisite for
transparency in SSPA design, the complexity of how and by whom a message is
constructed may be lost. In the field of marketing consumer products, efforts to control and
56

manipulate beliefs about the speaker is a multimillion dollar industry and users often do
not have access to all the relevant information. By promoting the languages and
credibilities of engineering and medicine, marketing and design efforts in the field of
consumer SSPA’s attempt to construct a perception of a speaker who possesses wisdom,
virtue, and good when the reality may be entirely different.
Bounded rationality and satisficing. Social Scientist, Herbert Simon (1956)
argued that humans have numerous limitations in decision making behaviors and,
individuals have a tendency to “satisfice” by seeking a merely reasonable solution rather
than to optimize by considering other options that might be more complex, but more valid.
Further, many researchers have found a general preference for reductive explanations
(Hopkins, Weisberg, & Taylor, 2016; Craver, 2007; Garfinkel, 1981; Trout, 2007) and
argue that individuals tend to seek mental shortcuts to decision making (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) especially in times of uncertainty or high cognitive load.
Commercial SSPA’s are likely to appeal to consumers who seek to reduce the
cognitive load related to careful, critical decision making. In theory, adding self-sensor
data as a new factor in decision making could represent a new layer of complexity
especially if that data requires special skills to understand. However, if self-sensor data is
presented to a user as a simplification of a number of other complex factors, it may be
interpreted as a short-cut to decision making. For example, say a person needs to monitor
their level of alertness and anxiety in order to perform their job. To make judgements about
their mental state they must make subjective observations about how their body feels and
weigh this with memories about how they have slept, what they have eaten, etc. within the
last 24 hours or so. Consider a SSPA designed to monitor brainwave sensor data (e.g.
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EEG), galvanic skin conductance, sleep data etc. that the user can also use to make
judgements about their mental state. These raw sensor data may convey nuanced
information about mental state, but understanding the implications and limitations of these
data and weighing the differences could be time consuming and stressful and would not
reduce the cognitive load of the original task. However, if the raw data is accompanied by
an approximation or summary, such as a simplified numeric rating, an avatar’s facial
expression, or a simple thumbs up or down for alertness and anxiety, this short-cut may be
intuitively more satisfying and persuasive than the raw data alone because it conveys a
sense of “understanding;” not only of the data, but of the self.
Even in the absence of a deeper understanding of how self-sensor data is relevant
to an interventional message, it may still be perceived as adding volume to a body of
“evidence.” In terms of attitude formation and decision making, researchers find that
volume of the arguments can lead to persuasion even when the arguments do not add
additional substance (Calder et al., 1974). This poses a risk to users if the designers of a
SSPA are able to use self-sensor data to create an air of credibility for a prescriptive that
prompts a user to act in a way that is counter to their best interests (for example, claiming
that an individual’s sensor data indicate he/she needs an energy drink before continuing a
workout when, in fact, the energy drink is simply empty calories, and the prescriptive is
merely meant to increase sales).
False physiological feedback and persuasion. There are some older studies
investigating the role of physiological feedback on attitude change which have
demonstrated a persuasive impact. For example, Giesen and Hendrick (1974) had
participants watch a film about the use of pesticides while hooked up to a machine
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described as an arousal meter and found that subjects led to believed they were
experiencing high arousal during the film were more persuaded than participants led to
believe they experienced low arousal during the film. In a follow-up experiment using the
same methodology and film content, the researchers found that changing the meter label
from “arousal” meter to “belief” meter had similar persuasive impacts (Hendrick & Geisen,
1976). Participants led to believe they were experiencing “high belief” while watching the
film were more persuaded than the participants led to believe they were experiencing “low
belief” while watching the film. Interestingly, in this experiment some participants were
told the belief meter was very accurate and others were told the meter was not very
accurate, but this did not impact their findings; in other words, participants who were aware
they were using a meter that wasn’t very accurate were still more persuaded by “high
belief” feedback. Valins (1966) found similar effects by providing false heart rate
information to male participants while they looked at photographs of nude women. When
participants were led to believe their heart rate increased while looking at particular photos
of women, the subjects later judged those photos to be more attractive. Valins found that
even when participants were made aware of the deceptions and then rated the photos, they
still rate those photos as more attractive.
This early research indicates that physiological feedback does have an impact on
persuasion, though it is unclear whether these findings are indicative of the persuasive
impact of commercial SSPA given the undoubtedly substantial differences in the level of
technological experience these early subjects would have compared to today’s technology
consumers.
Present Study
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This study tests the hypothesis that participants led to believe a software application
is using their self-sensor data to assess the degree to which they like an image will be more
likely to agree with that assessment than participants led to believe the application is using
only a personalized algorithm. This study also examines whether variations in the way selfsensor data was visually presented to the participant impacts persuasiveness and whether
the participant’s preexisting attitude toward the image impacts the persuasiveness of the
SSD. The experiment uses an actual consumer SSPA, the MindWave Mobile headset by
Neuro Sky, to collect neurological SSD.
Persuasion and neuroscience. Although some of the most popular consumer
SSPA’s are wearables that track heartrate and movement (PwC Health Research Institute,
2016), use of wireless electroencephalography (EEG) for real-time monitoring of electrical
activity of the brain is a fast growing market and researchers and manufacturers are
motivated to develop “intelligent wearable, wireless, lifestyle EEG solutions,” (Mihajlovic,
Grundlehner, Vullers, & Penders, 2015). Two primary consumer related markets for
wireless EEG’s are emerging. First are consumer neuroscience wearables which are
primarily used by market research firms to study consumer behaviors related to attention,
engagement, and choice. These include devices such as the B-Alert (Advanced Brain
Monitoring, Inc., 2016), Mobita (BioPAC Systems, Inc. 2016), Emotiv EPOC (Emotiv,
Inc., 2016), and the EEG Module from iMotions (2016). Second are direct-to-consumer
wearables which are currently marketed primarily for sleep improvement, meditation,
stress management, and brain training, and consumers can buy these directly from the
manufacturer of from stores such as Amazon.com. These include devices such as
MindWave Mobile (NeuroSky, 2016), Muse (Muse, 2015), Sleep Shepherd (Sleep
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Shepherd, 2016) and the Emotiv Insight (Emotiv, Inc., 2016). These direct-to-consumer
wearables make no claims related to diseases or medical conditions and the headsets are
designed to be about as intrusive as a set of headphones so they would be described as
“low-risk, general wellness” devices per the FDA’s recent draft guidelines (Food and Drug
Administration, 2016; also see Ethics, Regulation, and Policy, p 11). Their intended use
claims include non-specific, but impressive statements such as “provides in-depth
information on your brain activity” (Emotiv, 2016), “take a snapshot of your brain in an
active state (and)…uses this snapshot as a reference to understand your brain signals,”
(Interaxon, Inc., 2016), and “interprets meaning of brain signals,” (NeuroSky, 2016.).
Despite inroads into neuroscience and the interpretation of EEG signals, there is
substantial debate among neuroscientists themselves regarding what brainwaves can and
cannot tell us about human behavior (Beaulieu, 2002; Rose, 2013; Uttal, 2012), and
consumers should be particularly skeptical about any behavioral claims or advice derived
primarily from this new form of self-sensor data. However, there is a substantial body of
evidence that suggest that arguments, especially those pertaining to explanations of human
behavior, that use neuroscience information to support them can be unduly persuasive to
laypersons.
While investigating the specific impact of neuroimages on juror decision making,
Schweitzer et al. (2011) found that mock jurors were more persuaded by a neurological
explanation for a defendant’s mental state than clinical psychological explanations.
Outside of a legal context, Rhodes, Rodriguez, & Shah (2014) looked at the impact of nonprobative neuroscience information on the perceived quality of a fake news article with
flawed scientific reasoning. They found that participants who read a news article
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accompanied by neuroscience jargon rated the quality of article and the study it described
higher relative to participants who read the article without the neuroscience jargon
included. In a second study they also found that including superfluous neuroscience
information increased perceived understanding of the mechanism described in the article.
In a series of four experiments, Fernandez-Duque, Evans, Christian, and Hodges,
(2015) conducted a similar study, this time looking at superfluous neuroscience
information paired with science articles that had either low quality or high quality scientific
reasoning. The researchers had participants read a set of vignettes, each describing a unique
psychological phenomenon. Each vignette including an explanation of the phenomenon
using arguments of varying quality, as well as superfluous information that was either
neuroscience, social science, or hard science in nature. Participants were asked to rate the
quality of the arguments presented. The researchers found that superfluous neuroscience
information increased the judged quality of the scientific argument relative to social
science information (i.e. that alluded to culture explanations) and the hard sciences
information (i.e. that alluded to metabolic and genetic pathways). They found this to be the
case for sound arguments and flawed arguments.
Numerous mechanisms have been proposed to explain why neuroscientific
information may bias lay judgments. Weisberg et al., (2008) suggested it may act as a
seductive detail that distracts laypersons from thinking critically about the other arguments
presented. Fernandez-Duque, Evans, Christian, and Hodges, (2015) suggest that the allure
of neuroscience may be the perception that allows “neat, tidy attribution to one causal
source: the brain.” Rhodes, Rodriguez, & Shah (2014) similarly suggest that it is this
reductionist quality of neuroscientific explanations for behavior that may appeal to
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laypersons when trying to grasp complex phenomena such as human behavior. In any case,
the notion that neuroscience based information may be unduly persuasive to layperson,
coupled with the relative novelty of using EEG data in consumer wearables makes this
form of SSD well suited to this study. By employing NeuroSky’s portable EEG monitor,
the MindWave Mobile, in a context in which participant believe their neurological data is
being used to interpret their attitudes, the persuasiveness of this form of SSPA can be
assessed by examining whether participants’ attitudes can be shifted with false neural
feedback. In this case, the “argument” being made is a statement about how the participant
feels about a particular image (in the form of a suggested rating of likability), and the
“evidence” of this argument is represented to the participant as either neural feedback from
the MindWave Mobile, or a computer algorithm.
Methods.
Recruitment of Participants. The original sample size consisted of 120 Arizona
State University student volunteers recruited primarily from the undergraduate psychology
department. All participants were informed they must be 18 years of age or older to
participate. Also, because the experiment relied on mild deception about exaggerated
capabilities of EEG sensor technology, only students enrolled in undergraduate psychology
courses were recruited for participation.
Of those who agreed to participate, two did not complete the study and three failed
the manipulation check. The manipulation check included two questions: (1) a multiple
choice question about what type of technology was used with four possible answers (e.g.
personalized algorithm, neuromonitor) and (2) a multiple choice question about how the
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technology worked with four possible answers (e.g previous ratings, brain waves).
Participants who got both questions wrong were excluded from the analysis.
The final sample size included 115 participants with a Mean age of 22.66 years,
83% were female, and all had at least some college level education.
Apparatus and materials. The primary equipment used for this experiment was
comprised of two components. The first was the MindWave Mobile headset by Neuro Sky
(see Figure 2) which is a consumer product (available for approximately $100 USD at the
time of this experiment) that monitors and outputs the EEG power spectrums (alpha waves,
beta waves, etc.), propriety measure for attention and meditation, and eye blinks. The data
were processed via various free and paid software applications marketed to consumers as
brain training and meditation exercises.
The second component was the computer software used to present stimuli to
participants. This program was developed using Visual Studio and C#. The program was
designed to 1) present instructions 2) present a series of images in random order and record
participant ratings of each image, 3) present a second series of images based on participant
input from step two, and 4) record participant responses to those ratings.

Figure 2 An image of the MindWave mobile headset by Neuro Sky (2016) that some participants
wore during the study.
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Three sets of images were used in the study. The first set contained 20 images of
water bottles that varied in size, shape, and color and had no visible logos or text. Because
participants were rating how much they liked or disliked each image and because a
spectrum of ratings would provide more meaningful results, the images were chosen to
include both aesthetically appealing and common bottle types as well as less common and
less appealing shapes. The second set contained 16 images of homes that were also chosen
to provide variety in aesthetic appeal; from extravagant to humble, and from well to poorly
maintained. The third set contained images of landscapes that once again were chosen to
provide variety in aesthetic appeal, from warm and inviting to cold and unappealing. The
bottle images were the only images that were part of the experimental stimuli (the other
two sets were included as distractions). Bottles are common objects in US culture with a
broad spectrum of uses and associations, so it was expected that participants would have a
wide range of opinions about these images, but that they would not be deeply held and
therefore would be susceptible to influence by the experimental manipulations.
Additionally, because the control condition led participants to believe that they were testing
a technology that was similar to those used by online retailers to make product
recommendations, bottle images fit well into the experimental narrative.
Design. This study employed a mixed factor design with two independent variables
(IV) manipulating the user’s beliefs about how the technology functioned (Feedback) and
manipulating how the user’s ratings toward a set of images at Time1 were changed for
Time2 (Change). Feedback was a between subjects IV while the Change variable was
within-subjects (repeated measures). The primary dependent variable was a measure of the
users Agreement with how well the technology deduced their attitude toward each image.
65

The Feedback dimension manipulated the manner in which the supporting
information was rendered to the participant during the experimental phase of the study
(Time2) in which participants were led to believe the software application they were using
assessed the degree to which they liked an image. This IV included 4 conditions. In the
Control condition participants saw a general statement that the likeability rating was based
on their personalized algorithm (see Error! Reference source not found.3, A). In the
Implicit condition participants saw a statement that the rating was based on their neural
feedback data (see Figure 3 B). In the Abstract condition participants saw the same
statement as well as a gauge-like iconograph (see Figure 3 Error! Reference source not
found.C). In the Explicit condition participants saw the same statement as in the Implicit
condition as well as a bar graph with numeric readings (see Error! Reference source not
found. Error! Reference source not found.D).
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Figure 3. Screenshots illustrating the four different Feedback conditions from Time2
during which participants were led to believe the application assessed the degree to
which they liked an image. A. Control. B. Implicit. C. Abstract. D. Explicit.

To examine the impact of a participant’s preexisting attitudes on the persuasive
impact of the neural feedback, some assessments presented by the software application at
Time2 were actually based on the participants’ earlier responses about the degree to which
they liked that image. The Change dimension manipulated the direction in which these
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ratings of stimuli from Time1 were changed (See Procedure for detailed explanation) for
Time2.
Each stimulus presented at Time2 appeared with an assessment of the degree to
which they liked an image (ostensibly based on their neural feedback or personalize
algorithm per condition). For the primary dependent variable, participants were asked to
provide a measure of Agreement for this assessment (See Procedure for detailed
explanation).
The final design can be represented as a 4 (Feedback: Explicit, Abstract, Implied,
Control) x 4 (Change: Same, Higher, Lower, Random) mixed factor design with
Agreement as the primary dependent variable.
Procedure. Before beginning the experiment participants were given an informed
consent letter outlining the nature of the study and their rights as a participant. Participants
were told they would be participating in a study about decision making and technology and
that they would be playing a short computer game, looking at some images of homes,
landscapes, and consumer products, and answering some brief questions. Finally,
participants were told that during some parts of the study they may be asked to wear a small
headset that measures brainwaves.
After reading the informed consent letter, participants assigned to one of the three
neural feedback conditions participated in a brief warm-up exercise using the MindWave
Mobile headset. MindWave users played a short computer game that comes as part of the
Mindwave standard software in which they watched a live animated representation of their
brain waves and attempted to “blow up” a wooden barrel on the screen by relaxing and
focusing on the image. This warm-up exercise was meant to demonstrate that the
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Mindwave Mobile device was a functional neuromonitor and to lead them to believe the
neuromonitor would be used to generate product recommendations later in the study.
Participants assigned to the personalized algorithm (Control) condition watched a brief
animated Power Point explaining what a “personalized algorithm” was. The purpose of the
Power Point viewing was to ensure that participants in the control condition had a basic
understanding of what was meant by a “personalized algorithm” and that their own
personalized algorithm would be used to generate product recommendations later in the
study.
After the warm-up exercise all participants were asked to complete a “training”
phase in which they would rate how much they liked or disliked a series of images and that
these ratings would be used to learn about their preferences to either create a personalized
algorithm (Control condition) or interpret neural feedback (Implicit, Abstract, and Explicit
conditions). During this phase (Time1) participants rated a series of images. Each image
appeared on the screen individually and, after 4 seconds, the participant was asked to rate
the degree to which they liked the image using a Likert scale of one-six (with one being
“very unpleasant” and six being “very pleasant”). The image series contained 16 images of
water bottles (randomly chosen from a pool of 20), followed by a series of 16 images of
homes and 16 images of landscapes. The images of homes and landscapes were included
as distraction to create a time delay between the participant’s first viewing of the bottle
images and their second which occurs at Time2.
At the end of Time1, participants were presented with a second set of instructions
letting them know that they would now be presented with another series of images and that
either their customized algorithm (Control condition) or neural feedback (Implicit,
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Abstract, and Explicit conditions) would be used to generate a likeability rating for each
image. To enforce the illusion that neural feedback was being used to generate likeability
ratings, participants were instructed to focus on each image for a few moments while
ratings were generated and the rating did not appear until 4 seconds after the image.5
During Time2 participants were presented with 16 bottle images, 12 of which were
selected at random from those the participant had already seen and rated during Time1 and
four that the participant had not seen previously. The 16 images presented during Time2
were presented in random order. See Error! Reference source not found. for an
illustration of how bottle images were selected from the pool of 20 at Time1 through Time2.

Figure 4. Illustration of how bottle images were selected from the pool of 20 at Time1 through
Time2. At Time1 16 images were selected from a pool of 20 images to appear in random order for
participants to view and rate. At Time2 the participant viewed a second series of 16 images; 12
selected at random from the 16 images rated at Time1 and the remaining four were those that had
not been selected from the original pool of 20 for viewing at Time1.
5

Note, in the Control condition a personalized algorithm would theoretically be able to make predictions
about the image without the user ever seeing it and therefore there would be no need for the participant to
look at the image for any length of time. However, since participants in all conditions were asked to
evaluate how they felt about the image by thinking about whether they agreed with the rating or not, this
instruction was kept constant for the control condition to avoid any confounds related to length of time each
stimulus was viewed.
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After the image was shown for four seconds, a second image appeared alongside
the bottle describing what the personalized algorithm or neuromonitor technology
calculated the participants “rating” would be for that particular image. The appearance and
description of the “rating” varied by condition (see Figures 3 A-D). While participants in
all conditions were led to believe the rating was derived by their sensor feedback (or the
personalized algorithm in the control condition), the rating was actually derived from the
participant’s responses during Time1. Four images were randomly selected to appear with
the Same ratings from Time1, four were randomly selected to appear with a rating 2 points
Higher, and four were randomly selected to appear with a rating 2 points Lower, (see
Error! Reference source not found.3 for an examples). The remaining four images
presented were comprised of those the participant had not seen previously and ratings for
these images were generated at Random using the same scale as the other 12. As a measure
of Agreement, after each image and its rating were presented, participants were asked to
indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the rating generated by their particular
technology by selecting one of three responses: “Should be Higher”, “Agree”, or “Should
be Lower”.
After rating each of the 16 images at Time2, participants were asked a number of
additional questions including a manipulation check asking what type of technology they
tested and how their technology generated their ratings. Participants were also asked a
series of questions about their personal experiences with wearable self-sensor technologies,
their attitudes toward the technology they used during the study, and basic demographic
information.
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Table 3

Example of participant data and average agreement values.

Bottle ID

Eg.
Response
@ Time1

Change
Direction

Rating
Presented
@ Time2

Eg. Raw
Agreement
Score*

Converted
Agreement
Value**

Avg.

bottle6.jpg
bottle0.jpg
bottle10.jpg
bottle9.jpg

4
4
6
3

Same
Same
Same
Same

4
4
6
3

2
3
2
2

2
1
2
2

bottle2.jpg
bottle4.jpg
bottle3.jpg
bottle19.jpg

3
4
3
4

Higher
Higher
Higher
Higher

5
6
5
6

2
1
3
2

2
1
1
2

(Lower)
1.5

bottle14.jpg
bottle8.jpg
bottle11.jpg
bottle5.jpg

5
4
5
4

Lower
Lower
Lower
Lower

3
2
3
2

1
2
2
3

1
2
2
1

(Higher)
1.5

(Same)
1.75

bottle12.jpg
NA
Random
5
3
1
bottle18.jpg
NA
Random
1
2
2
(Random)
1.25
bottle16.jpg
NA
Random
3
3
1
bottle1.jpg
NA
Random
6
3
1
Note. *1= "Should be Higher", 2="Agree", 3="Should be Lower"; **1=Disagree, 2=Agree

Quantitative Analysis. As mentioned in the design section, this study used a 4
(Feedback: Explicit, Abstract, Implied, Control) x 4 (Change: Same, Higher, Lower,
Random) mixed factor design with Agreement as the primary dependent variable. The first
test conducted was a mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to determine whether any
changes in the dependent variable, Agreement, were the result of the between-subjects
variable Feedback, the within-subjects variable Change, and/or an interaction between the
two. Prior to doing this analysis, note that although participant responses were recorded on
a scale of 1-3, responses of 1 and 3 both indicated disagreement (either because the
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participant felt the score presented by the program should have been higher (1) or should
have been lower (3)). To simplify the analysis the direction of disagreement was
disregarded and scores were converted to either 1 for disagree or 2 for agree. These new
scores were then averaged across each of the four iterations of each of the four Change
directions (i.e. 4xSame, 4xHigher, 4xLower, and 4xRandom), creating 4 average
Agreement scores per participant for Change (rather than 16). Table 1 shows an example
of participant data to illustrate how responses from Time1 were changed at each level of
the Change variable to produce rating for Time2 and how Agreement responses were
converted to an average score.
Using the average Agreement scores, no main effect of Feedback was found,
F(3,111)=.254, p=.858, and no interaction of Change and Feedback was found, F(9,111)=
.842, p=.577. However a main effect of Change was found, F(3,111)=50.715, p≤.001,
𝜂p2=.314. Table 4 shows a series of paired samples t-test for all levels of the Change
variable. Subjects tended to agree more with the recommendations made by the program
(regardless of whether they wore the neuromonitor or not) when the original score was kept
the Same (M=1.758, SE=.023), pushed Higher (M=1.733, SE = .022, or pushed Lower
(M=1.688, SE=.025) relative to recommendations made when the image was presented for
the first time with a Random score (M=1.412, SE=.025, all ps<.001). In other words, the
presence or absence of the neuromonitor feedback did not have an impact on whether the
participant tended to agree with the rating recommendations presented by the program in
Time2; however, participants tended to agree with the recommendation more often when
the image was one they had seen before (regardless of whether the recommendation was
the same, higher, or lower than their previous actual rating) relative to the random ratings
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presented for images they had not seen before. This finding is discussed further in the
Descriptive Analysis section.
Table 4

Paired samples t-tests for all levels of the Change variable.
Change
Same
Higher

Mean
Agreement SD
1.76
0.24
1.73
0.23

t
0.98

df
114

Sig.
(2-tailed)
0.329

Same
Lower

1.76
1.69

0.24
0.27

1.09

114

0.103

Lower
Higher

1.69
1.73

0.27
0.23

-1.57

114

0.117

Random
Lower

1.42
1.69

0.26
0.27

-7.85

114

<.001

Random
Higher

1.42
1.73

0.26
0.23

-10.11

114

<.001

Random
Same

1.42
1.76

0.26
0.24

-10.61

114

<.001

Random
Different

1.42
1.71

0.26
0.19

-9.92

114

<.001

Random
Non-Random

1.42
1.73

0.26
0.16

-11.10

114

<.001

Note. Also includes comparison of Random condition to combined mean
score of Higher and Lower (labelled as “Different”) and comparison of
Random condition to combined means of Same, Higher, and Lower
(labelled as Non-Random).

Although the analyses thus far indicate no impact of the Feedback manipulation, it
is possible that the manipulation could have had an impact on a subset(s) of participants.
To rule out this possibility additional tests were conducted using Agreement as the primary
dependent variable. First, a mixed ANOVA was conducted using Feedback and Gender as
independent variables to test for an interaction. No interaction was found F(3,107)=.107,
p=.956, but it is important to note that there were very few males in the sample. Second, it
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was suspected that individuals who seek out wearables on their own might also be more
willing to follow recommendations thought to be derived from the data a wearable
monitors. Participants had been asked to indicate if they currently owned or planned to own
biometric wearables, so a mixed ANOVA was conducted using this variable and Feedback
as the independent variable, but again no interaction was found F(3,110)=.669, p=.573.
Descriptive Analysis. Participants tended to agree with the ratings they were led to
believe had been derived from either their personalized algorithm or their neural feedback
(64.9%). This number increases when looking at rating that were not randomly generated,
in which case participant agreed 72.8% of the time (see Table 3 for frequency of Agreement
responses for all conditions). As noted in the Quantitative Analysis section, participants
tended to disagree more often with ratings that had been generated at random. One
explanation for this could be related to greater variability in randomly generated ratings
away from participants’ actual attitudes about the image. Bottle images appearing in Time2
that had been seen previously were always paired with a rating that was within zero to two
points of the participant’s original attitude rating (measured during Time1). However,
images appearing in Time2 that had not been seen previously were paired with a random
rating, with unknown variance from the participant’s actual attitude. For example, suppose
a participant’s “actual” attitude rating toward an image is a “one.” If the participant sees
this image at Time1 they will rate it a “one” and the image can reappear in Time2 with any
rating between one and three. However, if they do not see this image at Time1 it would then
appear in Time2 with a random rating of any number between one and six, which could be
up to five points higher than the participant’s actual attitude. Ratings in the Random
condition were not bound to be within two points of the participants “actual” attitudes and
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therefore the likelihood that the ratings would be disagreeable were higher for this
condition.
When participants who wore the Mindwave Mobile headset were asked if interested
in using a similar product to help with consumer purchases, 38.3% said yes, 53.1% said
maybe, and only 8.6% said no. There are numerous potential explanations for this. First,
participants may have merely been being polite. Second, recalling that participants tended
to agree with most of the ratings presented during Time2, this positive reaction may have
been a reflection of a positive experience with the technology.
Table 5

Frequency of Agreement responses for Time2.

Discussion. Despite numerous theoretical findings described earlier that suggested
the use of neuroscientific self-sensor data might be more persuasive in altering a user’s
attitudes than would be a personalized algorithm similar to those often employed to make
product recommendations by online retailers such as Amazon.com, this did not prove to be
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the case in this study. Because of limitations with the number of participants that could be
recruited for the study, a control condition in which participants would be led to believe
that their ratings in Time2 were merely generated at random could not be included in the
study design. Therefore, it can only be said that leading participants to believe their
brainwave data were used to interpret their likes and dislikes was no more or less persuasive
in shifting their attitudes than leading them to believe this was done by a personalized
algorithm. However, it cannot be said with certainty that, based on this study, either of
these methods is any more or less persuasive than if a participant were led to believe his or
her recommendations had been made by a monkey trained to draw cards randomly from a
deck. This is not to discount or specifically question the persuasive qualities of technology
qua technology, but merely to point out that it would be problematic to make any strong
claims that brainwave data is at least “as persuasive” as personalized algorithm data
without first understanding the degree to which either is persuasive at all in this particular
context.
Another factor that may have contributed to the null findings is the possibility that
participants had a tolerance of at least two points on the one-to-six Likert scale that was
used to indicate the likeability of each image. In other words, if ratings presented by the
program that were within two points of the participant’s original rating were generally
perceived as the same score, agreement with scores that were changed up or down did not
necessarily indicate successful persuasion. Future research should allow for a wider range
in the magnitude of change for scores at Time1 to Time2. Including more extreme changes
would help identify whether there is a threshold at which users may be persuaded by the
neuromonitor data, but not the algorithm or vice versa. This information could not be
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determined by looking at the random condition because the participant’s original attitudes
were not known.
If there was a threshold effect to explain why participants tended to agree with
ratings that were within two points of their original score regardless of condition, this does
not explain why the neuromonitoring condition was not more persuasive than the
personalized algorithm condition for scores that were randomly generated at Time2. As
described in the introduction and study overview, research seemed to suggest that the mere
presence of SSD, and specifically the presence of neuromonitoring data, would be more
persuasive than non-neuroscience information; however, the data in the present study did
not support this hypothesis. It is possible that the context in which neuroscientific
information was used in this study was not perceived to be as relevant as in the previously
cited research or it is possible that participants in this study, compared to those in previous
neurobias studies did not experience enough uncertainty in their decisions to consider
additional information that was available. In other words, it is possible that participants in
this study simply didn’t perceive that the neuroscientific information was relevant enough
to their decisions for it to be an influencing factor and/or there was not enough uncertainty
to seek additional information cues to make their assessment. This would explain why the
neuromonitoring conditions and personalized algorithm conditions did not differ in
persuasiveness. Future research should examine whether neuromonitoring data might have
a persuasive impact on decision making if the topics, images, or vignettes engage
participants in higher stakes decision making or decision making with a higher level of
uncertainty.
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Given the limitations of this study, as well as the breadth of research related to the
effectiveness of tailored messaging, evidence of the persuasive influence of false biological
feedback, and other research described in the previous sections, it is premature to suggest
that neuromonitoring data, (or SSD more broadly) are not persuasive or even unduly
persuasive. In addition to addressing the methodological issues described, to understand
the persuasive impact of SSPA’s continued research is needed to investigate different
sources of SSD (e.g. galvanic skin response, heart rate, etc.), different domains of decision
making (e.g. fitness, wellness, consumer choices, lifestyle decisions, etc.), the directness
of the causal link between the SSD and the message, the degree of uncertainty or emotional
investment in the decision process and so on.
CONCLUSION
The possibility that SSPA’s might be unduly persuasive should not be the only risk
factor investigated experimentally. Other social implications, such as the degree to which
SSPA’s may depress belief in free will and promote negative behaviors, should be
examined in the future. Furthermore, some of the social implications discussed here are
relevant regardless of the persuasive impact of SSD. SSPA’s represent a new opportunity
for governing people. Whether this will manifest in the future as primarily self-governance
as some have argued (Rose, 2007a; Rose, 2007b; Topol, 2011) or as merely a transfer of
individual (and collective) sovereignty to industry and state will rest on how these
technologies are designed and how persuasive they are. This research has argued that
consumer SSPA’s pose a unique threat to user autonomy because of qualities that tap into
numerous psychological phenomena of persuasion and because of little formal or informal
regulatory oversight. The discourse surrounding SSPA standards for avoiding risk through
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design and regulation that has taken place has focused on data security, privacy, accuracy,
and to some degree, physical harm, while the concerns raised in this research, related to
subjection, docility, medicalization, persuasion bias, and erosion of beliefs in free will,
have not been widely considered. For SSPA’s (and too many other forms of technological
innovations) the approach to considering these broader social implications is often “shoot
first, ask questions later,” i.e. bring these products to market, see what sticks around, and
see what the outcomes are. It’s unclear how responsibility for accounting for these social
implications should be assigned, whose moral authority can be trusted to do it, and what
values should play a role. Although engineers are centrally located in reflecting on and
responding to ethical implication of SSPA design and deployment, it is critical that
government regulatory bodies such as the FDA and the FTC place a higher emphasis on
SSPA risk, one that goes far beyond privacy and data security.
The economic success of consumer SSPA’s relies on convincing users that their
physiological states should not only be monitored, but also controlled. However, numerous
factors described in the research presented here suggest that, rather than empowering users
to access and unleash the body from some (imaginary) state of ignorance that ostensibly
puts wellness at risk, SSPA’s invite external actors into the users most intimate activities
and allow those actors to define that individual in unprecedented detail. By controlling this
knowledge and the standards through which these definitions are constructed, external
actors have the ability to remove the very control from the user that they claim to be
offering. This is not to suggest that all SSPA’s as they exist today necessarily transfer
control from the user to an external actor. These technologies can also be used to monitor
and control the user’s physiological states using only that body’s previous state as the frame
80

of reference for any implicit or explicit prescriptive (such as increasing strength or stamina
over past performance). In this case, it is possible that a user could in some sense be
empowered to control bodily processes solely on his or her own terms. However, the ability
to evaluate and compare oneself to others and against established norms is imperative to a
deeply seated drive to understand and control the “self” and its place in the world. SSPA’s
that promise this affordance will no doubt be appealing to a broad consumer base and, as
described earlier, current approaches to design and marketing of these technologies tap into
this drive using language and rhetoric that implies understanding the self can be achieved
through subjection of the body. What is critical to acknowledge, however, is that if users
are prevented from knowing the values and interests that underlie how these
understandings and modes of control are constructed, there is a greater risk that SSPA’s
may become not a tool of self-governance, but rather, a tool of social control. One in which
understanding the “self” becomes a process of corporate and state reflection to control
consumer and population behavior, while ironically lulling users into a sense that they are
participating in a process of deep personal reflection.
As a final note, it will be tiresome to some and critical to others that I to point out
that the research and arguments presented here, though critical, do not, in fact, constitute a
luddite call to ban SSPA’s. Rather, it constitutes a call to acknowledge the deeper social
implications of these technologies and to further examine how deficiencies in current
ethical analysis and regulatory considerations ought to be addressed in order to avoid
unwanted consequences; before, or at least at the same time as, a future of ubiquitous
surveillance of bodies and actions is being feverishly constructed. And to underscore that
the promises of user empowerment and personalized wellness stemming from advocates
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of self-quantification rest not merely in the expansions of the variety and details of SSD
data made available to users, but in the design and deployment of the SSPA’s that use these
data to influence user behavior and define the body.
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